The Philosophical and Practical Limitations of Genocide Prediction and Prevention

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Introduction

One legacy of the twentieth century is the spate of conscious acts of genocide, the willful extermination of a specific social group. While genocide arouses a multi-dimensional response, including a profound moral one, it is in essence an international crime, according to some legal experts, and, first and foremost, a state-induced crime. Throughout the course of this century – beginning with the German genocidal massacre of the Herero tribes in then Southwest Africa (now Namibia) and ending with the Serbian attempt to empty Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population by means of mass killings and forced expulsions – genocide has reared its head in numerous forms. And each time genocide took place, the agonizing question “How could it have been avoided?” followed upon realization of the full barbarity of what had transpired. Repeatedly, against the evidence, one tended to label a particular instance of genocide to be exceptional, an aberration, in the vain hope of being able to conclude that genocide was not integrally of this century and, more important, would not reoccur in this century. But it did: genocidal behavior can be located in all parts of the world in practically each decade of this bloody century. At some time, there were actually
two or more incidents of existential threats to targeted groups. In short, genocide during the twentieth century has proven to be a characteristic of the century rather than an exception. There is, therefore, reason to believe that the next century will be no different in genocidal blood-letting. Hence the urgent need to answer the question: “How can genocide be avoided?”

Once this disturbing truth of the persistent reoccurrence of genocide slowly sunk in, an ethical imperative followed: Genocide must not occur again; it is a moral obligation to preempt a genocide-in-the-making. Furthermore, if genocide is a state crime, then it follows that it is the state’s obligation both to prevent and stop genocide, at home and abroad. From this flows an urgent set of questions: how can one effectively cut short this lethal chain of genocides by preventing genocide in the future? Therein, of course, lies a theoretical absurdity, how does one stop what has not yet taken place? On a more practical level: is it possible to monitor the entire globe – since genocide can take place anywhere? Furthermore can the time and place of future events be reasonably pinpointed with any degree of accuracy upon which to base foreign policy?

To date, genocide studies have largely focused on the genocidal events themselves: data had to be assembled and assessed; background and circumstances
received particular analytic attention; genocidists and victims were carefully
scrutinized; losses in lives and property were meticulously calculated; and not the
least, the rest of the world was judged so as to establish degrees of guilt or
innocence for having had or not had direct or indirect contact with either the killers
or their victims. Glaringly missing is the comparative approach. For the most
part, Genocide Studies remain a series of parallel monographs of individual
genocides with little effort at discerning essential differences or similarities.
Instead, much more attention has recently been given to another sub-branch of
Genocide Studies, called Early Warning Studies.

   Early Warning Studies is predicated on two concerns and two correlated
assumptions: 1) the need and obligation to anticipate genocidal events well before
they happen (resting on the assumption that certain future events can be foreseen);
and 2) the need and obligation to take timely action to stop or frustrate genocide.
The latter, in turn, rests on the assumption that practical policies of intervention
and the means to do so can be put in place prior to a crisis, calling for timely
intervention anywhere in the world. It is the purpose of this lecture to examine
these two propositions – that genocide can be predicted and prevented –
philosophically and practically, not simply for the purpose of sheer intellectual
enlightenment within the context of Genocide Studies but with the express intent
to assess their central or tangential contribution to the furtherance of eliminating genocide.

At the outset it should be kept in mind that besides Genocide Early Warning Studies, Early Warning in general has by now become a small but growing and increasingly influential academic industry. Considerably more than a handful of researchers are now engaged in some kind of Early Warning research. Quite a few have moved over from the by now lucrative field of Conflict Resolution. Whereas Conflict Resolution began with an in situ approach, namely, to tackle conflicts in progress in the field (as the jargon goes), it later recognized that defusing conflicts in progress, while meritorious in itself, is, in practice too fragmentary and even self-defeating. It calls for study and negotiation to take place simultaneously. This has frequently led to amateurish and ad hoc so-called facilitating, which has more often than not made matters worse: conflict mediation, if improperly conducted, could and did further inflame a conflict e.g Somalia and Haiti.

That realization called for another approach, namely, anticipating conflict. Since the original tactic of intervention during the critical event could result in pouring oil onto fire, the new approach would, hopefully, avoid this and lead to
resolution by intervening *earlier*, prior to the critical moment of polarization. Ethnic polarization has become one of the major topics of study with the global rise of racial, mono-ethnonationalism. All too often inter ethnic conflicts have escalated into genocidal incidents and *bona fide* genocides. And this is how Conflict Resolution and Early Warning Studies began to converge. For the former, the need to identify potential conflict and for the latter the need for finding clues of the pre-genocidal served as a bridge for cooperation, especially in the search for an adequate methodology for identifying pre-conflict and pre-genocide incidents. Having said this, it is now time to turn to the first task, namely, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the pursuit of the pre-genocidal.

1. **The Limitations, philosophic and practical, of Genocide Prediction**

The temptation of knowing the future has been as irresistible as the seductive call of the syrens luring sailors towards shore where their ships crashed on the rocks, mercilessly hurling their unsuspecting crews to the ocean depths. Is the academic search for a key to unlock the secrets of the future equally fraught with commensurate dangers? Is it a pursuit of knowledge that not only cannot be attained but ought not to be striven for? That is to say: is the very act of searching for or researching the future not only futile but ethically questionable for violating a hidden commandment “Thou Shallst Not Know What Has Not Yet Transpired”?
The rhetorical question and the equally rhetorical answer left unexpressed are purely hypothetical. Yet do they have some merit? Do they convey a warning?

We are all well aware of the myth of Faust and his irrevocable bargain with the devil: unrestricted knowledge in exchange for his soul. Had Faust possessed an ounce of wisdom though, he would have rejected the devil’s tempting offer and avoided the trap. No doubt he recanted as he fell into the abyss. And yet, how deep is the curiosity of those engaged in courting the future to reveal something of herself. In their desire and claim to see ahead, beyond the present into the unknown (and unknowable) how much will they bend the data and make it “proof”?

A recent (31 July 1999) centerpiece article in The Economist attempting to project a glimpse into the world of 2050, is a case in point. It acknowledged that the directions of change and the acceleration of new developments make any kind of forecast an exercise of the imagination at best, at worst an act of folly and self-deception. Neither Hegel’s nor Marx’s nor Fukuyama’s claim of a terminal point in socio-economic evolution proved correct. On the contrary, the possibilities in the future are widening rather than narrowing. In the area of genocidal ethno-conflict, the article could only suggest more-of-the-same à la Huntington, unless a
reverse trend were to develop and the world (unlikely) would move towards
greater homogeneity and, hence, remove the foundation of further ethnic strife
leading to genocide. A Kantian world guided by (pure?!) reason seems unlikely.
Instead there is the likelihood of the certainty of the uncertain of what lies ahead,
namely, (possibly) more ethno-rivalry. Which, if accurate, at least in theory,
suggests patterns in ethno-induced circumstances that might be “predicted” (on
paper) by the application of chaos theory. At present it is being applied from
unraveling complex weather patterns and rationalizing the veerings of the stock-
market to making sense of brain functions. It is an open question whether it can
unlock the door to an understanding of ethnic conflicts and whether they are in fact
heading towards the genocidal.

The logical fallacy is clear: how can that which is not and/or may never be
reveal something of itself or be discovered piecemeal as in a jigsaw puzzle?
Simply put, that which is not, is not; similarly, that which might be in the
undetermined future is very likely not to be because another not-yet event may
happen in its stead. In either case it is a question of conferring substance on
something that has not taken place. This approach suggests that human events
basically follow along a deterministic trajectory, with hints (evidence) about the
future that, in turn, can be “reconstructed” in the same way that an archaeologist
reconstructs an ancient vase with but a few splintery shards, by connecting them and filling in the blank spaces on the basis of clues provided by the few extant remains. Similarly, the future is supposedly rendered visible by the “fragments” lodged in the past and present.

This methodology was and is still applied by New Testamentarians who extract hints of the coming of a Messiah buried deep in the Old Testament. Indeed, prophecy is one of the oldest activities associated with the need to foresee the future. Seers abound in most cultures, obviously fulfilling a deep psychological desire; palm-readers and fortune tellers and readers of tea leaves with their emphasis on personal love and wealth and death are in the same business of hinting what will be or could still happen. They are all in the company of the famed oracle in Delphi patiently awaiting the next seeker of advice on whether to change course or not. The delphic oracular pronouncements were fraught with serious consequences.

There is the well-known story of a Greek king going to Delphi to inquire whether or not to go to war. Whereupon the oracle replies, “A great king will be victorious.” Much elated the king goes to war only to be ignominiously defeated. Much annoyed, the King returns to Delphi to register his disappointment. “But I
warned you,” the oracle responds. “Did I not tell you a great king will triumph, and, as you tell me, a great king did win.” Does this mean we should abandon our curiosity about the future? Or would we be better off as functioning humans were we to know more, for example, when our life would come to an end? For academics is there a proverbial apple we should not bite into? But this is tackling the problem on a lofty plain. Let us return to terra firma and note the many efforts of unraveling the mystery of tomorrow on a more mundane level.

In our everyday lives we encounter professional predictors in many guises at every turn. In the physical sciences there are climatologists dispensing quotidian assurances of rain and/or sun (maybe both); satellite technology gives us round the globe information, providing precious time to prepare for a hurricane, somewhat less for a tornado, and even less for a typhoon. Each one gives off its signals prior to the event. Of even greater urgency is the need to know ahead of time the eruption of a volcano: to date vulcanology is a most uncertain science despite seismology and other tools; so far, all eruptions have come as a total surprise as in the days of Pompeii. Scientists fare little better with their attempts to fix the likely time and place of an impending earthquake, despite measuring numerous tectonic shifts. All these natural phenomena, as we know, are preceded by telltale signs, most if not all of which are only recognized as such after the fact.
Rear vision is always impeccable in these cases, but of no practical use when trying to look forward. In both instances— with volcanos and earthquakes— the future is like quicksilver, a slippery substance, suggesting that the future is not determined but happens capriciously. Philosophically we encounter the age-old dispute: the fixed future, the divine plan, versus the improvised, the unplanned, a future fixed by neither a measurable schedule nor any other kind of blueprint.

This quandary is reminiscent of that “dreary science,” otherwise known as economics, in which virtually all its practitioners spend most of their time diagnosing and, above all, prognosing, usually not ex cathedra (unless their educated guesses are proved correct) but laughably cautious to cover their flanks in case they are off the mark. Yet economists and their co-conspirators in the social scientists draw on huge supplies of data, building models and drawing graphs, all hopefully pointing (perhaps) towards the future which, as we know, remains coy and mercurial, only pretending to show something of herself, even if she is nothing but a substanceless phantom, without existence, except what is imagined. It is said the stock market is moved more by fickle psychology than by cold calculation, computers notwithstanding.
And so it is for the rest of the social so-called “sciences.” Sociologists look for trends: they amass mountains of data extracted from questionnaires in order to computer-construct complex, jargon-filled graphs and tables supposedly indicative of “patterns” allowing them to project “reality” beyond the present into the future; the national budget surplus seems to be an example of this. The patterns of the past are used as models (paradigms) for what is to come; timetables for yesterday become timetables for tomorrow, assuming collective human behavior – on average (a key term) – can be assured to repeat itself. The supposition is that the overall circumstances will remain constant. And still, the future escapes these specialists, simply because there are too many variables, too many individual decisions taken by persons unaware of the “averages” they are supposed to represent.

Thus, neither the natural sciences nor the social sciences – the hard and the soft disciplines – promise little success in predicting the future, despite sophisticated methodologies and tools. Given this disappointing track record, it ought to discourage anyone from attempting yet another academic venture, namely, the search for pre-genocidal early warnings. To date, the basic tools are both insufficient (if borrowed from other academic misadventures into the future) and almost non-existent (if originating from the new discipline itself.) While there
are adequate definitions of genocide – that is to say, one knows what one is
anticipating and hoping to forecast – there are, as yet, no reliable tools with which
accurately to fix the time and place of the next genocide. The most important lack
is the means to determine what makes an event pre-genocidal without waiting for
something that is unambiguously genocidal?

Take racism as an example. No one disputes that there existed a long
periods of virulent and violent racism in the United States during and after slavery.
Segregation and even persecution and lynching often rose to extreme heights. And
yet never for one moment did racism against blacks in the US lead to anything
even approximating genocide, not even the thought among policy makers. The
human rights and civil rights violations of racism pointed in numerous criminal
directions but not to genocide. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that had there
been an Early Warning sub-discipline monitoring the various permutations of
racism in the United States, one or more excitable scholar would have labeled
several incidents as sufficient evidence to call for a pre-genocide alert and all that
that can entail, as we shall see in part two. In fact there is little reason to doubt this
kind of hypersensitivity on the part of monitors of post-1945 racism, especially
keeping the Holocaust in mind. There are today those prone to regard US anti-
black racism as a potential, slippery slope towards genocide, regardless of the
overwhelming historical evidence to the contrary. Indeed there is a prominent museum on the Mall in Washington DC predating its pedagogy precisely on this false reasoning, by claiming that just as antisemitic racism led to the Final Solution, so the US anti-Black racism could lead to genocide. It is not difficult, therefore, to envision what would happen if excitable Genocide Early Warning whistle-blowers had their way, calling “Wolf!” or “Fire!” or “Genocide!” once too often.

In fact, let us assume several Genocide Early Warning systems to be in place, in academe, in independent think-tanks, and in government. Their task is to sound alerts, presumably graded, like those indicating an impending major storm or drought. What if conclusions, educated opinions are seriously divided whether genocide is or is not about to break out? Whose authority prevails in labeling a coming genocide? Will it be a political determination governed by criteria of expediency? That is how the crisis in Rwanda was never acknowledged by the Clinton administration as a crisis of genocide until well after the fact. Presuming – against all odds of success as shown above – that Genocide Early Warning can function reliably, there is still the matter of what to do and how to do it – that is, to preempt and prevent a genocide predicted in the future.
As we review this aspect, the *how* and *what*, it would be prudent to keep in mind the philosophical and practical caveats encountered in this first part. Briefly:

1. That which has not been, need not necessarily be; the possibilities of yesterday's and today's activities are infinite, pointing in countless directions.

2. Except for weather forecasting, neither the technologies of the natural sciences nor the methodologies of the social sciences suffice to provide even a reasonable assessment of the present as an index of the immediate future.

These warnings about the limits of predicting genocide are the same as the limitations associated with the problem of what and how to do anything to thwart genocide, assuming, for the sake of argument, that reasonably accurate prediction is possible.

2. The Limitations, philosophical and practical, of Genocide Prevention

The *What, How, When and Where* are the foci of this segment of the lecture with respect to the avoidance of genocide, once a warning has been sounded. The underlying assumptions for this section on prevention are two-fold: 1) that early warning as already pointed out is reasonably accurate and 2) that policy-makers will act accordingly. While in theory these assumptions are useful for model building, in practice they sound almost utopian. Everyone knows in fact that
predicting human events is mostly flawed and subject to high margins of error. Furthermore, one knows policy-makers will never allow themselves to be shackled irrevocably to a prior commitment without reserving for themselves a measure of review and even veto. Genocide Early Warnings will never automatically trigger off government action of prevention; in the best of circumstances there will always be a time-lag in the decision-making process which could prove fatal to tens of thousands. And this is purely on the theoretical level.

Delays will almost certainly hamper any government on the practical level, depending on the state of institutional preparedness. Thus, delay — any delay — in the process of curbing genocide has, inevitably, potential or actual deadly consequences: potential if the early warning slightly precedes the outbreak of genocide and actual if the genocide crisis is already in its early stages. In order to minimize the loss of life, early warnings will have to be early enough to avoid this dilemma of one being held responsible for many deaths as a result of a late Early Warning. This, in turn, pressures those responsible for issuing warnings to do so as soon as possible; yet they know that the earlier they make their call, the more likely the margin of error. Thus they are caught between a rock and a hard place. Relative accuracy in prediction rests on making the judgment for a coming genocide as close to the crisis as one can without issuing a post-facto diagnosis.
Thus, if effective action is to be taken, the window of opportunity between warning and intervention has to be open wide enough to allow for plenty of discussion and preparation without the danger of these negotiations paralleling the outbreak of genocide. This then is the dilemma. Warnings coming too early may very likely be wrong and lead to gross policy errors. In that case, when is an early warning early enough and when is early too early? Only hindsight can answer these questions. To act before the event is assuming it will definitely happen; to act during the event is – for the victims – too late and a contradiction of the raison d’être of Genocide Early Warning systems.

Assuming calls are made in ample time to intervene against genocide, there are still the three burning questions: What to do? How to do it? and When to do it? The fourth, where to do something answers itself: it is contained in the early warning call. When to do something, at least in theory, is also clear: namely, right after the warning has been announced, the earlier the better. In practical terms, however, that kind of an instant response is next to impossible, unless an on-going anti-genocide measure is already in place: diplomatic, economic, military, etc. This argues for a permanent mechanism, presumably internationally or, at least, regionally condoned and financed. This, too, is a major presumption that needs to be negotiated, for without it, all early warnings are moot if they do not lead to
some kind of effective – not just symbolic – action. The *when*, therefore, is a crucial *conditio sine qua non*; in genocide prevention, timing is of the essence, otherwise the genocidists will not be stopped let alone deterred. Inaction, of course, would be unacceptable. Genocide Early Warning left purely as an academic exercise is, in a very real sense, unethical; it would be the equivalent of charting the course of an advancing tornado without the Coast Guard giving advance notice to shipping and to coastal residents in the storm’s anticipated path.

Which leaves one with the problematics arising out of the *what* to do and the *how* to do it. The *what* can range from mild economic measures and other external persuadants to outright military intervention and occupation. The latter might require the deposing of a genocidal government and replacing it with one more tolerant of pluralism. In short, this latter kind of response belongs to the category of nation-building, a highly uncharted path that can more likely boomerang than result in a success story. Such an extreme course would not only be very expensive but raise numerous basic questions of international law.

At the heart is the legal issue of the violation of national sovereignty. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo have set a precedent enough to justify unraveling the state system that came out of the Treaty of Westphalia three and a half centuries
ago. The recent debate in the United Nations initiated by Secretary General Kofi Annan highlights the problem. Annan wants a clear statement to the effect that intervention – when civilian populations are clearly at risk – is fully justified and takes precedence over claims of sovereignty. Leading the opposition is China’s. Foreign Minister Tang Jianxuan made a clear argument against the principle of the right to intervention in speech given on 22 September 1999. To favor human rights over national sovereignty is, according to him, to invite “havoc.” The concept of humanitarian intervention is a guarantee for international destabilizations and opens the door to a revival of the equivalent of “gunboat diplomacy,” an obvious sore point in Chinese historic memory. He was supported by Jaswant Singh, India’s Foreign Minister, who also insisted that a nation’s sovereignty must not be violated if international order is to prevail. Others expressed hesitation about carte blanche military intervention in the name of human rights because it denied the right of bona fide civil wars to take place.

Unilateral intervention without prior philosophical/theoretical preparation can resemble pure imperialism, no matter what the rhetoric of justification. After all, what if the need occurs for the weaker nation to intervene in a genocidal crisis inside a major power? Will the collective, preventative international machinery always be superior to that of the major power accused of genocide? What if it is
not? Then genocide in effect will only be stopped in weaker countries. It should be recalled that the US never for an instant contemplated intervention into Russia’s murderous, quasi-genocidal war against Chechnya. After all, the Russian Federation remains a power with thousands of nuclear war-heads. From this one concludes that a nuclear power can safely engage in genocide inside its borders with the assurance of committing an international crime with impunity.

At the same time there is the situation in which no action is taken, even if the criminal state is small and vulnerable such as Rwanda. It was found that intervention in this case was not feasible: distance, terrain, national interests, etc dictated against US involvement. Unless there is a legal, binding obligation for action, no amount of Genocide Early Warning is of any real use. So knowing what to do is in itself not enough; there must be a permanent international authority and force prepared to deal with the practicalities of how to carry out a policy of intervention. Each incident of approaching or feared genocide poses its own individual problems that must be resolved ad hoc, case by case. Translating principle and policy into specific solutions also takes time; yet time is absolutely crucial in a genocide-prevention context.
Of course there is no such thing as complete readiness for all contingencies. Genocide could rear its head in numerous parts of the world, both expected and not. Sounding the alarm does not immediately mean there is always a team at the ready, one for each emergency. Each diplomatic, economic or military intervention must be geared to solving the specific problems posed by the characteristics of the anticipated genocide. Boycotts may or may not always be appropriate; bombing may or may not; some interventions may be less welcome than others; local resistance could act as a counter-deterrent and seriously delay intervention. Once again, Genocide Early Warning must truly be early enough to resolve the how of the anti-genocide equation. As the old adage goes, if there is one thing worse than preparation it is bad preparation. The danger of aggravating a genocidal situation is always present and must never be lost sight of.

Conclusion

Neither genocide prediction nor prevention has as yet developed reliable methodologies and accrued supportive track records. In practice, striving for both prediction and prevention can be counter-productive. That does not automatically speak against an Early Warning system and the machinery for anti-genocide action. It just suggests that we are still a long way from success. The world is by no means safe yet from genocide, and all means to remove the danger should be
explored. The entire enterprise of prediction and prevention is at present closer to an initial ideal than an advanced practice and calls for considerable patience, regardless of whether one is optimistic or pessimistic of managing the future.

At each encounter with genocide, two schools compete for recognition: one declares the all-embracing crusade against genocide throughout the globe is a pipe-dream; the other expresses the general hope that a patient, step-by-step approach is the proper way to gain control over a capricious future in which genocide could take place, sometime, some place. These two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They are approaches from two distinct vantage points: one begins with the general question of prediction and prevention while the other starts with the specific, a single instance of genocide. Both are fundamentally optimistic, though one is more cautious, the other more hopeful. Yet in their philosophical differences over the nature of the future, the two positions part ways radically: for one, even the near future remains essentially unknowable, hidden behind infinite possibilities; for the other, the near future is broadly knowable by means of models and statistics. Despite these philosophical and conceptual disagreements, both sides do not deny that some preventative steps ought to be contemplated, the pessimists accepting an *ad hoc* approach and the optimists a more planned approach to discerning what the future holds in store for us.
A final observation: given the guiding imperative of Genocide Prevention as a contemporary emergency, Early Warning research is unavoidably a part of policy making. Holocaust Studies, for example, were initially guided by the commitment to the new (11th) commandment “Never Again!” and its converse “Remember!” The latter of course is an appeal, not to memory for its own sake, but a call to action, namely, prevention. Initially, Holocaust studies were restricted to warding off a repetition of a second genocide against Jews. More recently it is a call to repel any danger of genocide threatening any group. Genocide Studies, therefore, are presently morally justified, authenticated, if you will, in as much as they serve the end goal, fighting against genocide. The time to study genocide for its own sake to satisfy intellectual curiosity is not yet. The study of genocide is unavoidable a study engagé, practiced for the sake of an objective social good—the eradication of the causes of genocide. Prediction and prevention are an integral part of that endeavor. To question this is to risk becoming a voyeur of a past evil by ignoring a similar evil in the present, and, thereby assisting in or encouraging its return in the future.

Which raises a central ethical question. To begin with the obvious: genocide is a crime, recognized as such by international law since the 1949 United
Nations Genocide Convention. Since then, diplomats and scholars have played prominent roles in determining whether an event was or was not genocide. To conclude to one's academic satisfaction that genocide did indeed take place is to implicate persons in having committed a crime recognized by international law. Such a conclusion is a public act; it can be used in court as supportive evidence. And still scholars act with impugnity, not held legally accountable for their footnoted accusations. That should not be. Those who hang labels of criminal behavior around others' necks must be held responsible in some manner. In the academic community there seems to prevail an eagerness to participate in the process of identifying and bringing genocidists to justice, an enthusiasm that sometimes amounts to arrogance, the arrogance of those not held in check. If indeed a scholar seeks to investigate the possibility of genocide they or she would have to apply, for starters, the strict rules of evidence of a court of law and not those looser ones of academe. Those lacking legal training should write with greater caution and circumspection before participating in the legal process. This only as a word of caution to a profession that often compromises itself due to overzealous scholars in the field of genocide detection.

To conclude in a more philosophical vein. The problematics of genocide prediction and prevention are embodied in two views of life. One is structured on
the general conviction of the power of the unpredictability of life. The overriding experience is the omnipresence of accident, natural disasters, unexpected violence, the rule of whim and caprice, forcing one to conclude that to live is to engage in constant improvisation. The other rests on the firm conviction that some things can be expected, and upgraded from the possible to the probable. For example, following the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, Alekša Džilas, a prominent Serb, commented on 15 July 1999, in the wake of the “liberation” of Kosovo’s Albanians, that “The possibility of revenge increases the desire.” That is, the NATO attack increased the Serbs’ wish to wreak vengeance on the Kosovars. The day would come, he asserted. Perhaps, when foreign troops leave; perhaps on another occasion in the distant future. But the desire remains a smoldering constant. After all the desire persisted for centuries following the defeat of Serbs by Turks in 1389. Another Serb, Duska Anastasijevic, a reporter, underscored the likelihood of another round of strife by pointing out: unless a Serbian Adenaur and an Albanian Mandela come on the scene, one must assume a future with the high probability of another bloody Serbian/Albanian war. In this case, it would be foolish to expect another future free of ethnic strife. This argument states: you have been warned!
References


