Defining Genocide, Comparing Genocides: Dilemmas and Solutions of a Methodological Quandary

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Introduction

In order to pursue a thorough scholarly investigation of genocide, two prerequisites must be met: 1) a governing definition of genocide, and 2) a common guiding schemata (anatomy) of genocide. The former is the key to reliable identification of genocidal events; the latter assures symmetrical comparison of genocides. To date, genocide studies possesses neither; it lacks both a satisfactory definition and a consensus as to the inner make-up of genocide. Without a definition one is impeded in separating genocidal events from the non-genocidal; and, lacking a basic blueprint, it is unclear how and what to compare and, thereby, determine distinctive singularities and commonalities separating and linking genocides.

I. Towards a Governing Definition of Genocide

Definitions are supposed to clarify and, therefore, to help identify. In fact, the search for an adequate definition can often lead to greater confusion and even controversy, bitterly divisive at times. Thus, when a new unnamed phenomenon appears, the first problem begins with the selection of an appropriate and, if possible, a value-free appellation. Grappling with genocide is fundamentally no different.

Throughout human history there has been an uninterrupted chain of mass killings. In response to what seemed unprecedented massacres inflicted on European Jews by the Third Reich during World War II, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish
lawyer of Jewish background, coined the term "genocide" in order to highlight what the Nazis called the Final Solution of the Jewish Question. In so doing, Lemkin wanted to distinguish between exterminational and non-exterminalional massacres committed by Hitlerian Germany. This opened up the problem of determining when and how massacres cease to be large-scale killings and begin to assume genocidal characteristics; but can this distinction be made accurately using academic tools? Or is it largely based on personal impressions? Prior to having a name of its own, genocide was subsumed in "crimes against humanity" or into a category called "war crimes" as was the case during the post-World War II International Military Tribunal which convened in 1945.

The UN Genocide Convention of 1948 made genocide - now an accepted term - a separate criminal category. It tried to solve this problem of specificity and distinction from other crimes by supplying more or less descriptive criteria of what genocidal behavior consists of. In a sense this has been quite satisfactory, at least to serve as a guideline for those prosecuting genocide. Virtually all courts and tribunals have generally rested their determination of what makes a genocide and what is or is not genocidal on the UN declaration, although not entirely. Their definition of genocide and its criteria have both modified and added to those characteristics outlined in the Genocide Convention. Serious deficiencies of the UN definition have been found by the 1978 and 1985 reports of the Special Rapporteurs of the UN on its own Genocide Convention.

While all this has more or less satisfied those engaged with genocide as a crime, it has not for those dealing with genocide on other levels. Academics - historians, psychologists, political scientists, and policy makers - have inundated
the field with their conflicting, if not, contradictory definitions of genocide, to the point that the problem posed by this proliferation of definitions is threatening to undermine coherent study of genocide.

To begin with the outer extremities of the problem of definition, one I dub the "Katz-Charny Conundrum." In brief the dilemma of defining genocide is exemplified and distilled by these two polarized views, as follows:

1. In his voluminous tome, *The Holocaust in History*, Stephen Katz developed a methodologically but transparently flawed argument to prove that there is but one bona fide case of genocide, namely, the Holocaust, (that is, the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' as the extermination policy was dubbed by the SS.) He arrived at this conclusion by examining literally hundreds of instances of mass killing over the span of centuries, determining that, since none descriptively compares with the Holocaust, there remains but one full-fledged instance of genocide.

There are two serious errors here. One is that of false comparison: first, by purposely selecting one event to serve as the operating paradigm of genocide, Katz could safely conclude that all other events necessarily fail to meet the criteria and standards of his chosen genocide – the Holocaust. Since no two events are ever fully alike, then, logically, all others are automatically disqualified as full-fledged genocides. Secondly, Katz commits the academic sin of a priori reasoning. He consciously constructed an argument around a conclusion he wanted to prove prior to his writing the book, namely, to confirm that the Holocaust is unique, standing apart, alone and beyond comparison, a sole representative of a class of its own, a
super-genocide. All other instances of targeted mass killing of a group he classifies by inference as near-genocides or lesser genocides. Thus, Katz lays the groundwork for a hierarchy of massacres over which the Holocaust reigns supreme, incomparable, unique, with its own definition that applies only to itself. Whatever knowledge about genocide one needs, Katz concludes, can be gleaned from the Holocaust; any insights gained from other (i.e. lesser) genocides are necessarily secondary according to the Holocaust-centric formula posited by Katz.

2) On the other end of the spectrum of definitions of genocide is that of Israel Charny. His definition, if that is what it can be called, is so broad that a wide array of events fit within its range and, therefore, can be identified as genocides. Charny’s much too generous definition is so accommodating that several hundred events are classified as bearing the mark of genocide, including most of those excluded by Katz. This is best illustrated in his two volume *Encyclopedia of Genocide*. It is a remorseless compendium of massacral events, to each of which a genocidal status is attributed. The result is such a universalization of the act of genocide that the word lacks any meaningful core specificity.

**Diagram 1**

1) Reducing Katz’ reasoning diagramatically, two variations of Holocaust “supremacy” can be extracted. Essentially they are the same. The first (diagram A) highlights the “uniqueness” theory; the second (diagram B) stresses the Holocaust-centric mode.
In this depiction, the Holocaust (H) stands completely apart from other incidents of genocide (G). It is perceived as "unique", as a super-genocide that cannot be compared with other genocidal incidents.

In this depiction, the Holocaust is recognized as part of genocide, sharing some features with other genocides (zone 2.) But it also enjoys special distinctive features (zone 1), suggesting it is "more" than a simple genocide. It is "genocide--plus."

2) The Charny formula rendered in diagramatic form would look as follows:
In this diagram, every violent mass violation of human rights (MVHR-inner circle) is identified as genocidal, as falling within the greater orbit of genocide (outer circle.) Clearly this seriously blurs the distinctions between two phenomena in the absence of a discriminating definition of genocide.

So, how does one extricate oneself from the Katz-Charny Conundrum? The former, Katz, raises the specter of extreme selectivity in his definition, namely: “a genocide is the one I have chosen.” His brand of definition-by-radical-exclusion provides a self-serving methodology that can be applied by any scholar harboring a “favorite” genocide. The latter, Charny, is so indiscriminate (generous?) that virtually all assaults on collective human rights could be perceived as a form of genocide, leaving one with a quandary: unless proven otherwise, any massive, violent event belongs within the parameters of genocide. To repeat, how does one find a middle ground that cuts through this Gordian’s Knot?

In the absence of a satisfactory definition of genocide based on non-impressionistic and inflationary criteria, major consequences flow which severely hamper progress in genocide studies. On the monographic level, studies of a single event, claimed to be a genocide by the author, are based, more or less, on an
arbitrary definition satisfactory to the scholar. To date, each researcher operates with a definition that suits his or her purposes, namely, to include an event they are studying in the company of other genocides which have been equally arbitrarily dubbed genocides by their respective authors.

The result so far has been twofold. First, there are now a series of disputes questioning whether some events are indeed genocides. Thus, the bloody events accompanying the dismemberment of Yugoslavia have again and again been treated either as examples of genocide or rejected as falling outside the range of the genocidal. For example, the decades-long squabble over how to classify the lethal experiences of European Roma and Sinti at the hands of the Nazis: genocide or not? Prominent scholars like Yehuda Bauer of the Hebrew University, for years using the Katz mind-set, steadfastly and often vehemently denied that the anti-Gypsy policy of the Nazi regime was genocidal, until his recent volte face “conversion” not by intellectual reexamination but, one suspects, for expediency: further denial was becoming politically incorrect. In contrast, Ian Hancock of the University of Texas steadfastly and passionately made the (for years futile) case for the recognition of a Gypsy genocide, the Porrajmos. Thus, as events are unsystematically rejected or accepted as genocides, the absence of a more objective definition becomes that much more urgent.

Secondly, in seeking to compare genocides, events have first to be classified as such. But in the presence of several competing definitions, it becomes impossible to reach agreement as to which one should be applied. For example, given 20 massacral events, using one definition, the first 10 might qualify;
applying another, the second 10 events might be categorized as genocides. Using a third definition, the middle 10 could be so identified, etc.

**Diagram 2**

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0 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 20
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Definition 1  Definition 2  Definition 3

According to D2 and D3, events 1-5 are not genocides; yet they are according to D1. Conversely, according to D1 and D3, events 16-20 are not genocides, whereas they are according to D2. Further confusion could be compounded by introducing other definitions. Thus, without a governing definition there is no reliable way to sort out genocides from non-genocides. In turn, without a precise way of determining what event is or is not a genocide, rational comparison between genocides is impossible. The confusion is obvious. So how to escape this quagmire and arrive at a definition based on a sensible consensus as to what genocide is and of what it consists?

To begin with: What lies at the epicentre of genocide? What is the common denominator that binds all genocides together? As already pointed out, agreement on a satisfactory definition of genocide still bedevils scholars, though less so trial lawyers. As the post-Bosnia and Rwanda tribunals - entrusted with the responsibility of trying those apprehended and accused of having committed genocide - proceed, presiding judges and prosecutors tend to rely relatively
uniformly on the spirit if not the letter of the 1948 United Nations’ Genocide Convention as their basic guide. However, this admittedly pragmatic definition of genocide is more on the order of a descriptive formula rather than a conceptual definition; nevertheless, it continues to serve as a practical point of departure primarily in the pursuit of justice. Over the last ten years, lawyers have patiently honed and refined the UN statement, providing future jurists with an accumulation of nuanced interpretations and a body of precedence – case by case – in the hopes of developing legally acceptable formulations, less of the concept of genocide (what one understands it to be qua idea) but more of the acts deemed genocidal upon which the courts will accept evidence and rest their verdicts.

However, this aggregate approach to a consensus what genocide is and is not, though practicable in a court setting, is unsatisfactory in the seminar room. Whereas the descriptive mode, increasingly empirical, clarifies legal issues of genocide as practiced, it has the opposite effect on the analytic academic mind. In the intellectual quest for the quintessence of genocide, one searches for a fundamental concept with which to pinpoint the core meaning of genocide. In their exploration for the quintessence of genocide, academics are still searching for an Ur-concept with which to pinpoint the central meaning of genocide. This approach is less concerned with the surface details of what a genocide consists of than with the very idea of genocide. By means of greater semantic precision it seeks to arrive at a more philosophical determination of genocide, one which has less to do with the lawyers’ quotidian concerns for specific evidence of a specific criminal act.
than one more in tune with an intellectual's need for precise abstraction. Scholars of genocide, therefore, before attending to the secondary traits of a specific case of genocide need to forge an unambiguous conceptual grasp of the essence of genocide.

Originally the term genocide enjoyed the advantage of the seeming clarity of a neologism, until its meaning became increasingly obfuscated, buried under countless layers of surface description, ultimately and predictably putting the term's utility into question. So much so, that now another term must be found to determine what precise concept underlies the word genocide. For some years, those using the term genocide have found it to be more and more an empty vessel, a word in search of its meaning. Hence the present state of confusion.

At the heart of genocide lies the existential dimension, the thought and the act of threatening and endangering a group's existence. This could be expressed by the term elimination, the wish to eliminate a group, except genocide automatically also raises the thought of mass killing, whereas elimination, etymologically, connotes first and foremost "removal," or, in a genocidal context, "mass expulsion" - but not necessarily mass killing. Mass murder, however, should be acknowledged in one's basic understanding of genocide, while elimination (at least in English) only secondarily points towards large-scale killing. A term such as elimination, that only indirectly infers the wide destruction of life, misses the sine qua non of genocide, namely, posing a threat to a group's survival, in part as a result of a significant loss of life caused by man-made violence. However, a group could be made to disappear culturally by means of forced annihilation; yet most
genocides include massacral killings, often in response to opposition to forced cultural conversion.

A more satisfactory term to rectify this objection is *extermination*. It strongly suggests broad but focused killing on the order associated with genocide. Interestingly, in 1933, *prior* to the Holocaust, Lemkin had used the term “extermination” in his quest to have it declared a crime while attending the International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law held in Madrid that year, 6 thereby giving a clue of what idea underlay his newly-minted word – genocide - ten years later. Significantly the word extermination was also used relatively early to designate genocide, two years before Raphael Lemkin coined the word genocide, by which he meant extermination, an act of killing of a group. The occasion was a virtually forgotten Declaration made by the nascent United Nations on December 17, 1942. The statement was issued as a public condemnation of the systematic slaughter of Jews in German occupied Europe. It ran as follows:

**German Policy of Extermination of the Jewish Race**

The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovakian, Greek, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, U. K., U. S. and Yugoslav Governments and also of the French National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of the Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler’s oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. From all the occupies countries
Jews are being transported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to eastern Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken are ever heard of again... The number of victims... is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and children.

[The signatories] condemn in the strongest possible terms the bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hiterian tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolution to insure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end. [Emphasis added.]

(Notice the express focus on 1) intention, 2) on the systematic, 3) on extermination, 4) and on a group (the Jews of Europe)

Yet, extermination is still too one-dimensional; primarily, if not exclusively, it is limited to lethal, physical violence against a defined group, while genocide as just pointed out can go considerably further, beyond the mere destruction of the biological life of a targeted group. Genocide can include the wanton pulverization of the corpses and, importantly, the destruction of the entire creative heritage of a people: its literature, its architectural monuments, its arts, its entire legacy, in short, its culture. The possibility of culturecide as an integral part
of genocidal intention should not be excluded from the central thought that gives genocide its core meaning.

Like extermination, the term *eradication* also does not go far enough. It does, to be sure, convey the thought of the full physical extermination of a group’s biological existence, as well as of its culture as an intended biproduct, leading towards a state of *tabula rasa*. To *erase* is indeed a central aspect of genocide, literally and figuratively. The Nazi term *Judenrein* (territory cleansed of Jews) implied both a massive purge of undesired life, of reviled culture and despised memory, thereby implying a clean slate, of a future to be written *without* those erased. But we are still in the realm of pure action, of the descriptive, and insufficiently on the level of the philosophical that is required to supply *the* core meaning of genocide.

Some have suggested the term “extinction” - to render extinct - as the core concept underlying genocide. The problem with this proposal is that it denotes a restricted kind of extermination. When one refers to species and civilizations as becoming or being extinct, it correctly suggests that their future existence has been terminated, but it in no way denies their past existence. They remain, through memory, a part of history. However, some genocides are committed to the *explicit* intent of also destroying a collective’s past, of denying the group’s historic existence, which the milder concept extinct clearly does not! A more radically precise term is called for.

A more inclusive term that combines the existential destruction of a human collective, including its cultural legacy, is *annihilation*. Its etymology rests on the concept “nihil,” namely, nothing. As a verb describing an act, annihilate
unambiguously conveys the concept "to make – to transform Something - into Nothing." That is, while there once was a Something, there now is a Nothing. The idea of making Nothingness is commensurate in thought with the potentially multidimensional act of destruction that needs to be fully associated with genocide. It allows one to explore the philosophical implications of Nothingness as a positive goal, that is, as a desideratum of those committing genocide. Radical genocidal thought and reasoning seek to metamorphose the existential status of a people - its cultural achievements as well as its entire past - from the existent to the non-existent. This is one of the central aspects of genocide that needs to be fully incorporated into any conceptualization of the whole phenomenon.

Yet, in terms of satisfying a full consideration of all that annihilation implies, the term no longer is powerful enough to encompass the entire spectrum of core implications with which to express genocide in all its fullness, namely, the dimension beyond the philosophical. For that, one must turn to a synonymous but less frequently used term, nullification. It, too, is anchored in the idea of Nothingness, but it embodies a far greater emphasis on rendering something into a zero, into an absolute zero, the German das Null. This makes room for significant expansion of the idea of genocide, in this case beyond the realm of the purely biological, cultural and philosophical. While annihilation conveys a strictly rational side of genocidal behavior, as a willed consequence or conscious intention flowing from a well structured syllogism concluding with the fabrication of Absolute Nothingness, the word nullification adds a quasi-theological dimension to genocide, an aspect which needs to be included in a full conceptualization of the idea of genocide.
Genocide is made possible by thought (the desire) and the power to translate it into deed. In the biblical act of creation, the all-powerful creator has arrogated to itself the existential power both to call something into being, to sustain it and to unmake its existence. Similarly, by analogy, the genocidaire seeks to acquire the power to sustain the existence of a group and to obliterate it and everything associated with a targeted collective, including its historical existence through memory, as well as any conceivable form of an existential continuity in the future.

Genocide, therefore, can be perceived as an act of anti-creation, which aims at a totality of extinction so extreme that even the very act of genocide might be denied and its memory fully expunged from future records. In the ultra extreme, genocide – the victims and the genocidaires - will together be unacknowledged. The act of complete genocide will become itself a non-act. Genocide of this kind is an act of radical, absolute erasure of every aspect of existence, so radical that, at least in theory or intention, there will remain not a single shred of evidence of a genocide ever having taken place, as if the group had never existed, consigning it to a timeless, formless, condition of pre-creation, pushed back to a non-existence, back to the Tohu Vvohu of Genesis, the infinite Void.

This act of extreme nullification as just elucidated lies at the epicenter of genocide, providing the word with a precise but sufficiently broad conceptual foundation. An event, to be a genocide or, at least, to be genocidal, has to have a direct connection with an aspect of the idea of nullification. As illustrated, there is a broad but well defined spectrum of nullification - degrees of intention and consequence - which provide scholars with a sufficient but clearly delineated
interpretive leeway to determine whether an event warrants to be labeled a genocide of some kind, ranging from cultural destruction by forced assimilation, through basic biological destruction, to complete nullification which, in turn leads to the ultimate existential Nothingness, the consignment to the Void in the name of a utopian vision which perceives genocide as a means to a better world.

A Brief Excursus: On Thinking Genocide

Before proceeding to the next section, the construction of an anatomical rendering of genocide, it might be helpful to become aware of the central actors of any genocide, the genocidaires, the sine qua non of the crime. If one is to compare genocides, then comparison must begin with a comparison of those who thought of committing the crime, who planned it, and who executed it. It is their role that sets the tone of each act of genocide. The singularity of each genocide begins with the originality of the genocidal criminals. All other similarities and/or dissimilarities between genocides are relatively secondary; at the very least they follow, in declining order of importance, the genocidaires, even the victims are less central to genocide. In fact, a study of the victims necessarily tells us less about a specific genocide or about genocide in general. That is why in the following diagram of the Anatomy of Genocide proposed in Part II the genocidaires are located dead center. Not to fathom their thought processes which set genocides in motion is not to grasp the particularity of a genocide and the commonalities all the genocidaires have in common as exponents of the principle of nullification.

Nullification as understood above provides an entrée into the mind-set of the genocidaire, a much too neglected field. How does a nullifier think and reason? To date, the psychology of those bent on genocide has been associated
with a wide range of terms from qualities questioning the sanity of the perpetrator(s) (madmen) to the satanic (evil doers.) In between are related emotive terms such as the predicative “monster” and the adjectival “cold-blooded.” These are, of course, amateur attempts to probe the minds of those who think, preach and carry out genocide. However, once one accepts the absolute existential nature of the act of genocide - as an expression of nullification - a determination of the character of genocidal thought can be made.

In essence it is a variant of totalist thought, a particular form of mentality. Totalism sees the world in polarizing absolutes: friend/enemy, good/evil, right/wrong. This fixed attitude is often found in the context of doctrinaire religions and secular ideologies. It is an-all-or nothing mentality. It is a variant of Utopianism⁷ – the blind pursuit of a specific perfect society or world order. Genocide is committed in the name of a vision of perfection, which, in turn, promotes totalist thought and deed. By extension, those who seek – for whatever reason – the obliteration (some kind of nullification) of a targeted group – think totalistically. They behave, therefore, quite logically, but solely in absolute terms. Their reasoning is that of the doctrinaire with a laser focus on a single purpose.

A satisfactory definition of genocide must take into account the totalist dimension in the definition of genocide. An aspect of nullification and, therefore, of totalism, must be present in any event classified as a genocide. There must be some form of a direct endangerment of a group’s existence, a fact already acknowledged by Lemkin. Events lacking this dimension are something not genocide, and they need to be labelled otherwise by such generalists as Charny.
II. Towards a Methodology for Symmetrical Comparison of Genocide: The Anatomy of Genocide

Without a systematic comparison of genocides, genocide studies will remain a fragmented field, a hodge-podge of uneven monographs, each devoted to one particular genocide. Yet this problem cannot be overcome unless genocides, properly identified as such by a governing definition, are also systematically compared according to a set of rational guidelines. These must originate from an accepted anatomy or skeletal structure, serving as a reference point, a source of key aspects of genocide which need to be compared, as a means of distinguishing and, equally importantly, relating genocides to one another into types.

If common agreement of a conceptual definition of genocide can be mustered, then identifying individual cases becomes easier. And once individual events have been categorized as genocide they can then be more readily classified into clusters, into types sharing common characteristics, whether primary or secondary.

Establishing a typology of genocides is still in its infancy\(^8\) for two reasons: 1) the lack of agreement as to what is an objective conceptual definition, 2) the absence of agreement as to what and how to compare. The task of what to compare is made difficult, if not impossible, due to an absence of a workable anatomy of genocide. There is as yet no consensus as to how to break genocide down into its essential primary and secondary component parts. Once these have been established, only then can systematic and consistent comparison begin. As to the how to compare, this is a methodological problem still to be developed. Once the
what and the how of genocide comparison have been resolved, valid types or groupings can be set up.

Which leads to the last point: namely, What is legitimate comparison and what is not? There are two broad approaches, one academic (functional) and one political (subjective.) The latter, basically impressionistic, strives to set up a highly subjective, vertical hierarchy of genocides according to non-academic criteria; ranking genocides according to such fuzzy (essentially subjective) concepts as uniqueness, primacy, significance, importance, impact, etc. This approach, ascribing degrees of prominence to each genocide, is inherently biased and is employed by those promoting a favored genocide. Intellectually this kind of pseudo-comparativism is a cul-de-sac. The former, in contrast, seeks to look at genocides horizontally and, therefore, in clusters (types) according to objective criteria such as those suggested in the “Anatomy.”

This comparative approach needs considerable development to overcome monographic parallelism or isolation, and its twin, monographic parochialism. The former leads to single genocides studied by experts independently of each other, one rarely referring comparatively to another genocide, largely because expert knowledge in most cases is limited exclusively to one case of genocide, knowledge of another being fragmentary. The latter, monographic parochialism, is also the result of single-case specialization from which, in this case, one draws unsubstantiated broad conclusions about genocide in general from but one instance, thereby committing the academic sin of leaping injudiciously from the particular to the general, a common temptation to be sure and one encouraged by the Katz model.
Diagram (3): The Anatomy of Genocide

I.

1. Background
   Domestic politics, economics, culture, etc.
   Previous massacres

2. Antecedents
   Ideology (propaganda, rhetoric)
   An emerging crisis (polarization)

3. Circumstances
   Prevailing crisis: e. g. civil war, revolution,
   colonization, irredentism, etc.

II. THE EVENT

1. Dramatis Personae
   The genocidaires and collaborators
   The victims, refugees
   Rescuers and resistance
   The Bystanders and Neutrals,

2. The Blueprint of Genocide:
   The Plan
   The Means
   The Results
III. Consequences

(Post-Genocide)  1. The Survivors  Restitution

  2. The Criminals  Trials and Punishment

  3. Social Reconstruction  Reconciliation

  3. Denial

  4. Long range repercussions

Essentially, this schemata is quite simple. Basically chronological, it breaks genocide into three major sequential parts: before, during, and after. Each of these is broken down into sub-topics. The goal is to achieve both temporal and topical contextualization. Obviously, additional topics can be appended; nevertheless, the fundamental anatomy remains intact affording a workable way of selecting aspects of genocide to be compared, thereby assuring a symmetrical approach to comparison. This, in turn, will permit systematic grouping of each instance of genocide alongside those with which it shares common features, i.e. a typology of genocide.

Which brings us full circle: I began with a declamation that definition should clarify. Does indeed the application of the concept nullification help clarify or does it further obfuscate our understanding of what in essence genocide is? Similarly by applying an anatomy of genocide based on the above definition, is
genocide comparison made easier? These are the two questions each scholar must confront and answer.

5 Encyclopedia of Genocide, 2 Vols. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000)
7 See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) in which he closely links authoritarian political behavior to utopian aspirations.
8 See Henry R. Huttenbach "Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of Categorization," Holocaust and Genocide, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1988), pp. 287-303. Since then there has been no follow-up of this pioneering effort.
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