War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975–99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia

Ben Kiernan

Cambodia, East Timor, and the United States

On July 5, 1975, two months after the communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam, Indonesia’s President Suharto visited Washington for his first meeting with U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The conversation ranged over Southeast Asian affairs. Suharto assessed the U.S. defeat in Vietnam: “It is not the military strength of the Communists but their fanaticism and ideology which is the principal element of their strength”—something he said Vietnam’s anticommunists had not possessed. Suharto continued: “Despite their superiority of arms in fighting the Communists, the human factor was not there. They lacked this national ideology to rally the people to fight Communism.” But Indonesia was different, he said: “We are fortunate we already have this national ideology [Panca Sila]. The question is, is it strong enough?”

On December 6, Ford and Kissinger in turn called on Suharto in Jakarta. Ford told him that “despite the severe setback of Vietnam” seven months earlier, “[t]he United States intends to continue a strong interest in and influence in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and Asia. . . . [W]e hope to expand this influence.” Ford was returning from China, where, he said, “we made it clear that we are opposed to the expansion of any nation or combination of nations.” The United States aimed this message not at China but at its rivals. Kissinger informed Suharto: “We believe that China does not have expansionist aims now. . . . Their first concern is the Soviet Union and their second Vietnam.” Ford agreed, saying, “I had the impression of a restrained Chinese
foreign policy." Suharto asked whether the United States believed that Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam would "be incorporated into one country." Ford replied: "The unification of Vietnam has come more quickly than we anticipated. There is, however, resistance in Cambodia to the influence of Hanoi. We are willing to move slowly in our relations with Cambodia, hoping perhaps to slow down the North Vietnamese influence although we find the Cambodian government very difficult." Kissinger then explained Beijing's similar strategy: "the Chinese want to use Cambodia to balance off Vietnam. . . . We don't like Cambodia, for the government in many ways is worse than Vietnam, but we would like it to be independent. We don't discourage Thailand or China from drawing closer to Cambodia."2

Even as Ford and Kissinger aimed to strengthen the independence of Pol Pot's Cambodian communist regime, another Southeast Asian humanitarian disaster was in the making. In that same December 1975 conversation, Suharto now raised "another problem, Timor." He needed U.S. support, not condemnation, for planned Indonesian expansion into the small Portuguese colony. "We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action." Ford replied, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue." Kissinger then added: "You appreciate that the use of U.S.-made arms could create problems. . . . It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self-defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. . . . We understand your problem and the need to move quickly. . . . Whatever you do, however, we will try to handle in the best way possible. . . . If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home."3 U.S. policy opposed Vietnamese expansion and supported Indonesian expansion. Washington approved the independent existence of the Khmer Rouge regime, but not the independence of East Timor. It was prepared to sacrifice that independence to strengthen U.S. influence in Jakarta.

Suharto saw the green light, and Indonesian paratroopers landed in Dili the next day. The Cambodian genocide had already begun, and the Timor tragedy now commenced. The death toll from the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999 would reach approximately 150,000, a fifth of the territory's population.4 This is much lower in absolute numbers but proportionately comparable to the 1975–79 Cambodian toll of 1.7 million in a population of 7.9 million.5 There are other similarities. In each country, an initial, small-scale civil war preceded major international interventions. The two genocides that began in 1975 were also each in turn followed by extended foreign occupation and, finally, by United Nations intervention.
War and Genocide in Cambodia and East Timor

The first Cambodian civil war, from 1967 to 1970, had pitted a few thousand insurgents of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, or “Khmer Rouge”) against the independent regime of Prince Sihanouk. The war became internationalized after Lon Nol’s coup of March 18, 1970, when the Vietnam War smashed across the border. Vietnamese communist and anticommunist forces, and U.S. ground troops and air fleets, turned Cambodia into a new battleground. More than 100,000 Khmer civilians were killed by U.S. B-52 bombardments alone. Sihanouk joined forces with the now rapidly growing Khmer Rouge in a wider civil and international war. The Khmer Rouge defeated Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic and entered Phnom Penh in April 1975, two weeks before the Vietnamese communists took Saigon.

Pol Pot’s victorious Khmer Rouge immediately attacked into Vietnamese territory, only to be rebuffed there by the newly triumphant communists. Cambodia renewed its border attacks in January 1977 and escalated them over subsequent months. Phnom Penh declared war at year’s end and rejected the Vietnamese offer of mutual pullback and negotiations. In mid-1978, the Khmer Rouge regime put down a mutiny in Cambodia’s Eastern Zone, and its massacres of Cambodians and ethnic minorities reached their peak. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded and quickly drove the Khmer Rouge army across the country to the Thai border. Hanoi’s occupying forces established a new Cambodian government and army, headed from 1985 by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Khmer Rouge troops continued their attacks from sanctuaries in Thailand. Vietnam’s withdrawal in 1989 was followed by the UN-sponsored elections of 1993. These brought to power an uneasy coalition of Hun Sen’s People’s Party and the royalist Funcinpec, led by Sihanouk’s son Prince Ranariddh. This coalition, dominated by Hun Sen, finally defeated the Khmer Rouge insurgency in 1999.

Two months later, a UN-appointed Group of Experts concluded that the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders should be prosecuted by an International Tribunal “for crimes against humanity and genocide.” The events of 1975–1979, the legal experts reported, fit the definition of the crime outlawed by the UN Genocide Convention of 1948. In addition to committing “war crimes” against Vietnam and Thailand, the Khmer Rouge regime had also “subjected the people of Cambodia to almost all of the acts enumerated in the Convention.” Did it carry out these acts with the requisite intent and against groups protected by the Convention? According to the UN experts,

[The existing historical research justifies including genocide within the jurisdiction of a tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders. In particular, evidence suggests the need for prosecutors to investigate the commission of genocide]
against the Cham, Vietnamese and other minority groups, and the Buddhist monkhood. The Khmer Rouge subjected these groups to an especially harsh and extensive measure of the acts enumerated in the Convention. The requisite intent has support in direct and indirect evidence, including Khmer Rouge statements, eyewitness accounts and the nature and numbers of victims in each group, both in absolute terms and in proportion to each group’s total population. These groups qualify as protected groups under the Convention: the Muslim Cham as an ethnic and religious group, the Vietnamese communities as an ethnic and, perhaps, a racial group; and the Buddhist monkhood as a religious group.

The UN legal experts added that “the intent to destroy the Cham and other ethnic minorities appears evidenced by such Khmer Rouge actions as their announced policy of homogenization, the total prohibition of these groups’ distinctive cultural traits, their dispersal among the general population and the execution of their leadership.”9 Of the Cham population of 250,000, for example, approximately 90,000 perished in four years, many of them deliberately killed because of their ethnicity. Under such conditions, combined with utopian Maoist forced labor programs and Stalinist exterminations of “class enemies” among the majority Khmer population, 1.7 million Cambodians perished.10

While recognizing these crimes against humanity, some legal experts doubt that the legal definition in the UN Genocide Convention—attempted destruction “in whole or in part” of “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”—covers either the Khmer Rouge mass murders of Cambodia’s noncommunist political groups and defeated officer class or Indonesia’s mass murder of political groups in East Timor from 1975 to 1999.11 Objections to a legal interpretation protecting “political groups” also exclude the Indonesian army’s mass extermination of its domestic Communist Party (PKI), over half a million of whose members were killed in 1965–66.12 But the crimes committed a decade later in East Timor, with a toll of 150,000 in a population of 650,000, clearly meet a range of sociological definitions of genocide used by most scholars of the phenomenon, who see both political and ethnic groups as possible victims of genocide.13 The victims in East Timor included not only that substantial “part” of the Timorese “national group” targeted for destruction because of their resistance to Indonesian annexation—along with their relatives, as we shall see—but also most members of the twenty-thousand-strong ethnic Chinese minority prominent in the towns of East Timor, whom Indonesian forces singled out for destruction, apparently because of their ethnicity “as such.”

As in Cambodia, a small-scale civil war preceded the Timor tragedy. In mid-1975, a short conflict in the Portuguese colony led to unexpected victory
for its independence movement, Fretilin. Jakarta’s armed forces invaded the territory on December 7. Full-scale war raged until 1980. The occupation continued to take lives for another twenty years, even after a 1999 UN-organized referendum demonstrated that 79 percent of East Timorese wanted independence. Then, in a preplanned operation, Indonesian occupation forces sacked the territory, destroying 80 percent of the homes, deporting hundreds of thousands of people to West Timor, and killing possibly one thousand. U.S. President Bill Clinton insisted that Indonesia “must invite” an international peacekeeping force to take over East Timor. Australian troops led in the UN forces, as Indonesian soldiers left much of the territory in ruins. In UN-organized parliamentary elections in 2001, Fretilin won 57 percent of the vote. In the April 2002 presidential elections, Fretilin’s former leader, Xanana Gusmão, won 79 percent and its founding president, Xavier do Amaral, won 17 percent. On May 20, 2002, after more than two years of transitional rule, the UN handed over responsibility to the new independent state of East Timor.

The two cases of genocidal mass murder in Southeast Asia thus share a roughly contemporaneous time frame and a combination of civil war, multiple international intervention, and UN conflict resolution. But ideological cross-currents abound. Jakarta pursued anticommunism; the Khmer Rouge were communists. In East Timor, the major Indonesian goal was conquest. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge goal was revolution. Maoism influenced Pol Pot’s CPK regime, but it also influenced the Fretilin resistance to Indonesia. U.S. policy makers supported the invading Indonesians in Timor, as well as the indigenous Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Both perpetrator regimes exterminated ethnic minorities, including local Chinese, as well as political dissidents. How did Indonesian anticommunist counterinsurgency and Cambodian communist revolution both lead to such horrific results?

As I will argue, the genocides were in part products of international alliances and impositions. But they also reflected and provoked indigenous divisions, both ideological and regional. Were these divisions in both cases also ethnic? Domestic coalitions formed and ruptured over time. The CPK’s Maoist ideology combined explosively with its virulent Khmer racism and expansionism, leading it to seek to eliminate both political and ethnic enemies and to launch attacks on all neighboring states. Fretilin Maoists, by contrast, fought Indonesian aggressors, but they also fell out with other Fretilin leaders, local elites, regional coalitions, and military professionals. Was this in part for ethnic reasons, as in Cambodia? Regional and political differences plagued the Khmer Rouge, too. The 1978 rebellion by the Eastern Zone CPK forces against the Party Center constituted the major armed resistance to the genocidal regime. In East Timor, from the start, political and regional divisions also debilitated the pro-Indonesian cause, not just the Fretilin resistance. But to
understand fully the conditions in which these divisions emerged, and to what extent they were comparable, it is first necessary to examine the international forces that abetted both the Suharto and Pol Pot regimes.

**Green Lights from Ford and Kissinger**

Suharto had first raised the issue of the Portuguese decolonization of East Timor at his July 5, 1975, meeting with Ford and Kissinger at Camp David. Describing Indonesia as “a unified nation without any territorial ambition,” which “will not commit aggression against other countries . . . [or] use force against the territory of other countries,” Suharto nevertheless pointed out that for East Timor, “an independent country would hardly be viable,” and that “the only way is to integrate with Indonesia.” However, “The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced.” Suharto concluded that “Indonesia doesn’t want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia.”

In this way, six months before ordering the December 1975 invasion, Suharto secured U.S. acquiescence in the territory’s prospective incorporation by Indonesia. The expansionist impulse would be denied; the excuse, the communist threat. While the U.S. Department of State called the Timorese independence movement, Fretilin, “a vaguely leftist party,” Kissinger labeled Fretilin “a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia.” Suharto considered its members “almost Communists.” Jakarta saw a “Communist wing” of Fretilin in Timorese Maoist students educated in Lisbon during the 1974 revolution there.

From March to July 1975, the Portuguese authorities organized local village elections throughout East Timor. Fretilin won 50–55 percent of the vote. Its main rival, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), favoring gradual progress toward independence, received slightly fewer votes. Apodeti, a small party favoring union with Indonesia, came in a distant third. Fretilin had managed to bring a nationalist message to a population of 650,000 divided into possibly thirty ethnic groups speaking fourteen distinct languages. This multicultural success, which included members of Dili’s one-thousand-strong Muslim Arab community in Fretilin’s largely Catholic ranks, would remain one of the party’s strengths. Fretilin did remain suspicious of the local Chinese, a largely urban entrepreneurial community that failed to find a voice within Fretilin, which cited reasons of class but not race.

Suharto announced following his return from the United States on July 8, 1975, that East Timor lacked the economic basis for viable independence. This was the backdrop to an attempted coup in Dili by Fretilin’s rival UDT on
August 11. In Washington the next morning, Philip Habib told Henry Kissinger that authorship of the coup was still unclear: ”[I]f it is an Indonesian move, or the Indonesians move against it . . . we should just do nothing. It is quite clear that the Indonesians are not going to let any hostile element take over an island right in the midst of the Indonesian archipelago.” Only if the coup proved to be a pro-independence move would the U.S. act—that is, against independence. Kissinger said, “[T]he Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later,” ensuring merely “the disappearance of a vestige of colonialism.” Habib added that “we should not get ourselves sucked into this one by having opinions.”

Civil War

In mid-June 1975, Fretilin forces led by a former Portuguese soldier, Hermengildo Alves, had briefly seized power in Oecusse, a small enclave of Portuguese territory within West Timor. Jill Jolliffe reports that “the Portuguese regained control after sending a negotiating force from Dili as a result of which Alves was gaol ed for twenty days and UDT and Fretilin agreed to rule jointly.” This coalition prevailed in the Oecusse enclave for the next few months.

However, within four days of their August 11 coup in the capital, UDT leaders arrested more than 80 Fretilin members, including future leader Xanana Gusmao. UDT members killed a dozen Fretilin members in four locations. The victims included a founding member of Fretilin, and a brother of its vice president, Nicolau Lobato. Fretilin responded by appealing successfully to the Portuguese-trained East Timorese military units. UDT’s violent takeover thus provoked the three-week civil war, pitting its fifteen hundred troops against the two thousand regular forces now led by Fretilin commanders.

By the end of August, UDT remnants were retreating toward the Indonesian border. A UDT group of nine hundred crossed into West Timor on September 24, followed by more than a thousand others, leaving Fretilin in control of East Timor for the ensuing three months. The death toll in the civil war reportedly included four hundred people in Dili and possibly sixteen hundred in the hills. In the aftermath, “numerous UDT supporters were beaten and jailed” by the Fretilin victors.

Indonesia stepped up its plans for invasion. In early September, as many as two hundred special forces troops launched incursions, which were noted by U.S. intelligence, and in October, conventional military assaults followed. Indonesian forces murdered five Australian journalists in the border town of Balibo on October 16.
In September, the leader of the pro-Indonesian Apodeti party, Osorio Soares, remained “freely able to move about,” but as Indonesian incursions escalated, Fretilin took Soares and several hundred other Apodeti and UDT members into custody. Political positions had hardened. Fretilin had begun as the Timorese Social Democratic Association, led by Jose Ramos Horta and former Jesuit seminarian Xavier do Amaral. Since the UDT coup, however, what Jolliffe calls “a discernible shift in power” had brought the ascendancy of a more “inward-turning” nationalist Fretilin faction led by Nicolau Lobato. They blended notions of “revolutionary African nationalism, pragmatism and conservative self-reliance,” but, according to Jolliffe, “operated from a solely nationalist framework with the stress on meeting local needs by whatever means necessary, whether socialization or foreign investment.” Fretilin’s left wing, too, “did not regard themselves as Marxists but as nationalists who believed they could draw on Marxism and adapt it to nationalist ends.” As Jolliffe puts it, “The consequence of the marriage of these two streams was a Timor-isation of the leadership following the coup period, accompanied by an emphasis towards black nationalism rather than social democracy.” Helen Hill suggests this meant African-style politics rather than “black nationalism.” Beyond an anti-Chinese or anticapitalist undercurrent, evidence of indigenous racist ideology is sparse.

A full-scale Indonesian invasion loomed. Portugal had evacuated its officials offshore. Fretilin formally declared East Timor’s independence on November 28, 1975, and a Fretilin cabinet took office. Its eighteen members included a Portuguese and two Arabs, all members of the party’s Central Committee (CC). Jolliffe writes of the new government’s leadership, Xavier do Amaral, Nicolau Lobato, and Mari Alkatiri, that “The two principal figures were practicing Catholics, the third a practicing Moslem.” There were no ethnic Chinese members.

Invasion, Genocide, and Resistance, 1975–80

Political Turmoil and Division

Jakarta had secured the support of some of the defeated UDT leaders as well as the Apodeti party. Two East Timorese chiefs from the West Timor border area also proclaimed the support of their small Kota and Trabalhista parties for integration with Indonesia. Kota was a monarchist group established by a number of liurai (district rulers, or “petty kings”) with several hundred members. It “appeared to be a racially pure satellite of Apodeti, based on an inner circle of tribal leaders with access to the mystical rites of the traditional
culture.” Trabalhista had “a dozen or so members, many of whom came from the same family.” This lineup enabled Suharto, in his talk with Ford and Kissinger on December 6, to claim the support of “four parties” from East Timor, adding: “The local kings are important, . . . and they are on our side.”

Following the Indonesian invasion the next day, retreating Fretilin forces released a number of their Apodeti and UDT prisoners. But in the hills several weeks later, they summarily executed eighty Apodeti members, including the party’s leader, Osorio Soares, and possibly seventy UDT prisoners, including Secretary General Fernando Luz. To compound the tragedy, as the Indonesians landed in Dili, according to James Dunn, “a large number of Apodeti supporters, who had just been released from internment by Fretilin, went out to greet their liberators, to be machine-gunned in the street for their trouble.” Indonesian troops shot down thirty Apodeti supporters in cold blood. An Apodeti member “was shot while presenting his party identification card to a group of soldiers.” As we shall see, Indonesian force would soon also be turned against other non-Fretilin groups, such as the ethnic Chinese.

The Indonesians soon appointed the Kota leader, Jose Martins, son of a liurai from Ermera in western East Timor, to a prominent position. However, Jakarta’s constituency even among anti-Fretilin Timorese quickly collapsed. During a March 1976 visit to the United Nations, Martins defected and criticized Jakarta’s intervention. Another initially pro-Indonesian Timorese official, UDT’s founding president, Mario Carrascalao, was placed under house arrest in West Timor and repatriated to Portugal in mid-1976. A third “prointegration” Timorese official also defected to Portugal. Indonesia announced on January 31, 1976, that all Timorese political parties had now “dissolved themselves.” Just in case, Jakarta banned them on February 3. It then turned to traditional rulers from the western part of East Timor. After formal “integration” of the territory in mid-1976, the liurai of Atsabe became the Indonesian provincial governor and the liurai of Maubara became chair of the new province’s legislature. Thus the strength of pro-Indonesian feeling was limited to traditional rulers in the west of the territory.

Differences quickly emerged in Fretilin ranks as well. On the morning of the Indonesian invasion, Fretilin’s founding president, Xavier do Amaral, allegedly set out for the capital, telling his cabinet minister, Eduardo dos Anjos, “I am going to Dili to ask the Javanese why they [are] invading our homeland.” The next day, dos Anjos told Fretilin Central Committee member Xanana Gusmao that do Amaral had threatened to “speak with the invaders to ask them to retreat immediately!” Xanana recalls that “Eduardo managed to convince him to stop such strange and daring behaviour!” A month later, in January 1976, do Amaral approached Fretilin’s vice president, Nicolau Lobato, suggesting they “ask the United Nations to hold a referendum on self-determination.” Lobato
and the chief of staff of Falantil (Fretilin’s army) “categorically rejected” this proposal, arguing that the issue was now closed, since independence had been unilaterally proclaimed on November 28.48

The War

According to Australian intelligence, by April 1976 Indonesia had 32,000 troops engaged in East Timor and another 10,000 in reserve in West Timor.49 Against these, Fretilin deployed 2,500 regular troops and 7,000 part-time militia, and could draw upon 10,000–20,000 reservists, all trained by the Portuguese.50 Suharto acknowledged in August 1976 that “the Fretilin movement is still possessed of strength.”51 Indonesian intelligence reportedly estimated in September that Fretilin still fielded as many as 5,000 guerrillas.52 Australian sources reported by late 1976 that Indonesia had lost 10,000 troops killed, wounded, or missing.53 In early 1977, a senior Indonesian officer conceded that Fretilin had inflicted up to 5,000 casualties.54 But the invaders took a much greater toll on Fretilin forces, and by 1978 had also organized two Timorese battalions of their own.55

A discernible regional pattern began to emerge. Indonesia was able to count on liurai and other leaders from the northwestern part of East Timor. Within the resistance, as we shall see, moderate or conciliatory factions of Fretilin appeared strongest in the north-central sector. The Fretilin resistance would find its firmest support base in the remote eastern sector of the half-island.56

There were also ideological divisions. In 1984, Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong described three major issues that had divided Fretilin’s resistance since 1975. These were: “compromise with the enemy, the nature of the war, and the implementation of Fretilin’s social and political programs.” Firstly, from the start the majority of Fretilin’s fifty-two-person CC opposed negotiations or compromise with Indonesia.57 But in early 1977, “the leadership split over the question,” leading to do Amaral’s dismissal. The CC was committed to a Maoist-inspired self-reliant strategy for the achievement of independence. Secondly, there was further division over the nature of “people’s war,” a strategy Fretilin adopted at its national meeting at Soibada in May–June 1976. Many of the professional army officers who joined Fretilin in 1975 had been trained by the Portuguese to keep the army out of politics. They differed with those leftist Fretilin leaders who insisted that “the political line prevail over the military line” and that peasant militia be trained. Army officers also tended to resist overall military and political coordination, retreating into and thus strengthening regionalism. Thirdly, Fretilin’s political leaders emphasized rural development and egalitarian social policies that conflicted with local, traditional, hierarchical structures in some communities and regions.58
In the first year and a half of the resistance war (1975–77), Fretilin president Xavier do Amaral worked sporadically with his vice president and prime minister, Nicolau Lobato. Both were reportedly shocked at the scale of Indonesian brutality. As pressures escalated, however, differences between the two men grew, and in September 1977 Lobato had his superior do Amaral arrested for “high treason.” In an extended denunciation speech broadcast by Fretilin radio on September 14, 1977, Lobato acknowledged that “for over a year, the Radio Dili of the Javanese invaders has spread the story that there is a serious confrontation” between himself and do Amaral. “There was some truth in all this,” Lobato now announced.59 As we shall see, divisions in Fretilin ranks were not only regional and ideological, but also rather volatile, as circumstances and opinions changed over time.

Fretilin’s minister of information and national security, Alarico Fernandes, reflected this changing pattern in the different positions he adopted during 1975–78. A former meteorologist and noncommunist social democrat, he had originally seen Austria and Scandinavia as political models for Fretilin.60 But after the UDT’s violent coup, Xanana Gusmao says, Fernandes became a “real executioner” with “a frenzied thirst for vengeance.” Before the Indonesian invasion, Fernandes announced, “I’ll continue to stay [in] Fretilin but I will not accept communism.” Gusmao implies, but does not clearly state, that Fernandes was responsible for the execution of the UDT prisoners after the invasion. As the war against Indonesia ground on, Fernandes hoped for assistance from socialist countries, which never came.64 In mid-1976, he aligned himself with the professional military faction, but now also proclaimed, “I accept Marxism as the only way of liberating our people.”62 Initially opposed to negotiations, Fernandes finally lost hope of international support in 1977–78, when he “began to waver and slowly shifted” toward compromise with Indonesia.63 By then, internecine purges were escalating. The soldier Hermengildo Alves, second deputy secretary for defense and, according to Gusmao, an “incorrigible drunk,” had also become a “real executioner.”64 And the Maoist left wing of Fretilin, Gusmao later wrote, was also responsible for “purging waves of massacres of nationalists” whom it “assassinated as reactionaries and traitors.”65

Despite internal violence and instability, for the first years of the war Fretilin mounted a highly successful resistance to Indonesia.66 About forty of its fifty-two CC members escaped death or capture during the initial invasion.67 (Jose Ramos–Horta and Mari Alkatiri, who were abroad, took up the diplomatic struggle at the UN and elsewhere.) Nicolau Lobato’s rambling speech of September 1977, revealing the intense political and regional differences, also conveys an impression of great mobility on the part of the Fretilin leaders, of often free movement of forces and units, of mass meetings and assemblies in the hills, and of large areas and populations under Fretilin administration, despite
occasional serious harassment from the Indonesian occupiers. A report from Indonesian Catholic Church sources in late 1976 estimated that "80% of the territory is not under the direct control of the Indonesian military forces." A foreign diplomatic delegation, which visited East Timor in May 1977, reported that Indonesia still controlled only one-third of the territory, while Fretilin controlled another third and was able to move freely in the remaining third. The next month, Alarico Fernandes claimed in a radio broadcast that Fretilin "controlled most parts of the country, 80% of the national soil, defeating the vandal Indonesian invaders on all fronts." Nicolau Lobato added that "all over the country the resistance is still very strong despite the continuous raids deeply launched by the enemy to the large areas under our forces' control." As Dunn has pointed out, "an indication of the extent of Fretilin's control is that it was able to hold the town of Remexio, only 15 kilometres from the capital, almost without interruption for more than three years."

Of the territory's 1974 population of approximately 650,000, an Indonesian-attempted census in October 1978 returned a population estimate of only 329,000. Possibly 200,000 more may still have been living in Fretilin-held areas in the hills. In the east, for instance, Indonesian officials later acknowledged that in 1975–76, "a large part of the population in this region fled to the mountains." As late as November 1979, Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar conceded that only half of East Timor's pre-1975 population had been brought under Indonesian control. Jakarta's hope of a quick victory had foundered.

But Nicolau Lobato's prediction of triumph over "senile Javanese expansionism" was also premature.

The Genocide

Indonesian massacres of Timorese began on the first day of the December 1975 landing. Dunn calls the assault on Dili "one of the most brutal operations of its kind in modern warfare. Hundreds of Timorese and Chinese were gunned down at random in the streets." The Bishop of Timor watched from his window as 150 people, including at least twenty women, were systematically shot on the town's jetty. Five hundred Chinese were killed on December 8 alone. About forty unarmed Timorese men were murdered in the south of the capital on December 9. A priest reported that the invaders killed about two thousand people in the first few days, including seven hundred Chinese. John Taylor reports many testimonies "of entire families being shot for displaying Fretilin flags on their houses, of groups being shot for refusing to hand over their personal possessions, of grenades being rolled into packed houses, and of Fretilin sympathizers singled out for immediate execution."
ter included the wife of Vice President Nicolau Lobato, shot dead on the dock. Her sister saved their infant son at the last minute.81

The massacres then spread to the coastal and hill towns. Dunn continues: “When they finally forced Fretilin to withdraw from Aileu, Indonesian troops, in a brutal public spectacle, machine-gunned the remaining population of the town, except for children under the age of four, who were sent back to Dili in trucks.” The killings at Aileu even distressed Tomas Goncalves, son of the liurai of Atsabe, a leading supporter of integration with Indonesia.82 Citing Dunn, Taylor reports that “in the villages of Remexio and Aileu, south of Dili, everyone over the age of three was shot.” Taylor adds, “When Indonesian troops entered Aileu in February 1976, it contained 5,000 people. When a group of Indonesian relief workers visited it in September 1976, only 1,000 remained—they were told that the remainder had moved to the mountains.”83 A visitor found no Timorese in Ainaro in late 1975. Of Baucau’s population of 85,000, 32,000 met the arriving Indonesian troops on December 10, 1975, but by the end of February 1976 most had fled the exactions of the occupiers, leaving a population of only 9,646. In mid-1976, “When the towns of Liquica and Maubara were eventually wrested from Fretilin’s control the Indonesians put to death nearly all members of their Chinese communities.”84 Twenty-six people were executed in Liquica in May 1976 alone. Some survivors did remain in these towns, while many others fled to Fretilin-held mountain areas. But the Indonesian massacres took a heavy toll. A Timorese guide for a senior Indonesian officer told Dunn that “in the early months of the fighting, as the Indonesian forces moved into the central regions, they killed most Timorese they encountered.”85

Perhaps the worst massacre took place just inside Indonesian West Timor. At Lamaknan in June 1976, Dunn reports, “Indonesian troops who had been badly mauled by Fretilin units took their vengeance on a large refugee settlement which housed some 5000 to 6000 people.” After setting fire to several houses, the troops fired at the refugees for several hours, “shooting down men, women and children.” According to a Timorese truck driver for the Indonesian forces, about two thousand people died.86

The president of the pro-Indonesian provisional government of East Timor, Lopes da Cruz, announced on February 13, 1976, that 60,000 people had been killed “in the six months of civil war in East Timor,” suggesting a toll of more than 55,000 in the two months since the invasion.87 A late 1976 report from the Indonesian Catholic Church estimated that 60,000 to 100,000 Timorese had perished.88 In March 1977, Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik conceded that “50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in Timor, but we saved 600,000 of them.”89 On November 12, 1979, Indonesia’s new foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, estimated that 120,000 Timorese had died since 1975.90
The pressures of full-scale invasion and ongoing genocide initially brought to the fore Fretilin’s harshest and most radical elements, who began to predominate in the resistance. As we shall see, Indonesian military forces successfully targeted them for destruction in 1977–79, but still could not eliminate Fretilin, which soon reemerged and rebuilt itself under Xanana Gusmao as the relatively moderate nationalist movement of its early years. In 1987, Xanana condemned the “senseless radicalism” that had “paid no attention to our concrete conditions” and “made us intolerably overbearing and led us to put many compatriots on the same footing as the criminal aggressor.” But he also lamented that “humanity had closed its eyes to the extermination of the Maubere people, a genocide carried out by the assassinating forces of the Indonesian occupation.” More than $1 billion in military equipment, supplied to Indonesia mostly by the United States, but also by Britain, France, and Australia, had made this genocide possible.

The Resistance

How did resistance continue and function under conditions of Indonesian-imposed famine and genocide? And how did moderate Fretilin leaders regain the initiative in a movement under such a siege? The primary evidence of internal Fretilin division, both regional and ideological, only underscores the remarkable persistence and survival of East Timorese nationalism, despite regional differences but with minimal ethnic conflict.

In his September 1977 denunciation, Nicolau Lobato claimed that do Amaral had “forged a racist theory, attributing the cause of the war to the mestiços.” Lobato’s accusation of do Amaral’s racism against those of partial Portuguese descent is a rare suggestion of a politics of ethnicity within Fretilin. It certainly betrays political animosities. With partial fairness, do Amaral may have complained of Fretilin being run by a small non-Chinese mestiço elite rather than the indigenous Timorese majority. He may even have considered that Lobato’s “black nationalist” posture was an educated pretension disguising undemocratic exclusiveness, and that Fretilin’s multiregional national identity was urban in origin. But such political characteristics alone do not constitute racial persecution. Do Amaral’s complaint seems as much against top-down political domination. Lobato, acknowledging and denying that complaint, in turn accused do Amaral, son of a liurai, of drawing upon regionalism, traditionalism, and indigenous nativism to shore up his own political support. Such regionalism would indeed pose a ready challenge to nationalist imposition.

As nominal resistance leader in 1975–77, according to Lobato, do Amaral “never attempted to call a Fretilin Central Committee meeting.”
and fomented divisionism among Commands, among the rank-and-file, among different zones, among the different ethnic groups." According to Lobato, do Amaral’s stronghold was an arc of territory in north-central East Timor, from the mountains south of Dili to the coastal area to its west. “His feudal fiefs were Turiscai-[Ainaro] – Remexio-Lekidoe – Manatuto and part of Maubisse.”

What kind of regime prevailed in this north-central area run by do Amaral in 1976–77? Xanana recalls that in early 1976, “We traveled through Turiskai. Xavier was in his kingdom leading a carefree life under the feudalistic care of his brother.”96 Lobato, claiming that do Amaral “installed his relatives and friends,” also faulted “his protection of feudal institutions, like the rajahs, sucos [tribal groups], povoacaos [village units],” “These chiefs, together with the secretaries, some commanders and the major part of the other authorities are among his more loyal followers.” Do Amaral “spread through the mouths of his relatives and feudal bosses, the wrong theory that Turiscai was the fount of politics in East Timor.” Lobato called all this “an authentic feudal authority.”97

Locally, do Amaral seems to have made rather successful use of many of the traditional techniques of liurai rule. Lobato accused him of “recourse to use of corporal punishment, trials by Councils of Elders, … support for the feudal relations of parenthood, balaques (arranged marriages),” as well as lulics (animist sacred objects) “and other superstitious practices.” Do Amaral made “visits to festivities with big noise and big banquets; long voyages in cavalcade with the noise of numerous guards”; and “big colonial-style dances lasting all night and sometimes for a whole week.”98

Significant political issues also emerge from these cross-currents of rivalry, regionalism, and traditional leadership. Lobato envisioned “a new society, free from all forms of exploitation of man by man.” He considered “democratic centralism” to be “a fundamental principle … on which our politics are based.” He used the slogan, “Put Politics in Command,” by which he meant, “Between a civilian and a soldier, no wall exists … easily in practice, a civilian can become a soldier and a soldier, a civilian. The civilian tasks as well as the military tasks, are all political tasks. … [A]ll our acts must be oriented and directed to reach a political objective.” The CC meeting in Soibada from May 20 to June 2, 1976, which adopted the people’s war strategy, emphasized organizational as well as military tasks.99 Budiardjo and Liong report, “It was concluded that it would be suicidal to continue to engage in frontal combat against the numerically superior and much better equipped Indonesian army units. As a result the leadership decided to switch to more appropriate guerrilla tactics.”100 Maoist influence was now on the rise. It may also have been at this meeting that the CC created the Supreme Council of Resistance to oversee a protracted people’s war.
By contrast, Lobato said, do Amaral believed in separating the military struggle from the civilian sphere, giving the war precedence over state organization and economic tasks, and diverting scarce seed and human resources to the military on “the strange theory that in time of war there was no time to make politics” and “no place” even for military preparations. “Now, we have only to fight anyhow.” Thus, Lobato claimed, many “disorganized soldiers . . . were put unprepared in the frontline around Turiscal and Maubisse.” Do Amaral allegedly interpreted “Put Politics in Command” to mean placing his own civilian appointees in charge of the armed forces in his region. He turned his Zone Political Bureau into “a sort of mini-Central Committee, like little heads leading the people in the zone.” This threatened Lobato’s authority as prime minister and the Supreme Council’s overall control of Fretilin’s still substantial territory. As Lobato put it, “only one vanguard exists: the Fretilin Central Committee—as in a person’s body there is only one head.”

The rivals took their battle to Alarico Fernandes’ radio transmitter. Do Amaral supposedly gave “erroneous orders” that broadcasts were “not to attack any further . . . imperialism and its lackeys.” But Fernandes and Lobato broadcast that “the principal enemy of the people is imperialism.” Then “do Amaral started and sustained a very sharp polemic” with Fernandes. Meanwhile, Fretilin’s Maoists also opposed do Amaral, as well as Fernandes and the military officers, who all wished to seek external support for their resistance. Xanana recalls hearing an anti-Soviet Maoist slogan: “‘Imperialism [equals] social imperialism’ was the reason the politicians gave for rejecting the request for help to the Soviet Union. ‘I don’t want to know if it is imperialism or social imperialism. I don’t care if the help comes from America, the Soviet Union, China, or whatever. All I need is help. Isn’t that what we need?’ yelled Xavier, dazed and defeated.”

Strikingly, this partly political, partly regional internal conflict never became a racist crusade. In each political incarnation, the struggle remained nationalist and inclusive. The political divisions debilitated Fretilin, but did not prevent its eventual recovery across the territory, from a solid regional base in the east.

Implosion

Internecine conflict seems to have broken out first in March 1976, during a meeting of the CC Standing Committee at Fatu Berliu, the first of three Fretilin gatherings in the south-central sector. Fernandes “started to follow very closely the tracks of Xavier do Amaral.” Then the CC rejected do Amaral’s proposed candidates for membership. In April, at a meeting in nearby
Barique, civilian–military relations soured; “it became obvious that the military had an aversion towards those of us who were politicians. . . . Silence and an obvious dissatisfaction characterized the climate of argument. . . . Outside the meetings, the soldiers avoided the politicians.” However, “many” professional officers were promoted to the CC, “avoiding a rebellion of the soldiers.”

Perhaps a deal had been struck to permit the establishment of the Supreme Council of Resistance.

At the CC meeting held at Soibada from May 20–June 2, 1976, initial ideological discussions turned to Marxist concepts of the state. Do Amaral declared the state to be “eternal, coming from God.” In what Xanana calls “a revolutionary avalanche of minds,” the CC adopted its strategy of people’s war, with most favoring “self-reliance”—except the army officers. Do Amaral left the meeting “after only attending three days of its work, with the excuse of the National Celebration of May 20.” He planned “a big concentration of the masses in his feudal fief of Turiscai” in June. From then on, do Amaral allegedly “did not follow the resolution made in the May 1976 meeting.” He asserted rather “that the organizational work must come after the war.” He may also have objected to being subordinated to the Supreme Council. Moreover, Alarico Fernandes “aligned himself with the soldiers” and also walked out on the Soibada meeting, taking the radio transmitter. “The soldiers did not indicate any consternation,” which worried Xanana. “Xavier had lost control because he knew so little about politics. Nicolau was on the other side, the soldiers continued to form a separate nucleus, and the majority of us, the members of the FCC [Fretilin Central Committee], were unpolticised.”

The Soibada meeting saw other divisions, too. Some of the student leftists who had returned from Portugal, Xanana says, “tried to influence our thinking about ‘free love,’” while others, such as Vicente Sa’he, advocated a lifestyle of “puritanism” that earned more popular trust. Sa’he also gave Xanana a copy of *Historical Materialism*, “but I informed him I had already heard enough ‘isms’ in Barique.” More ominously, conflict continued between the CC majority and a group of Timorese sergeants led by Aquiles Soares, a liurai from the central-eastern region. These conservative nationalists, professional soldiers, rejected national political oversight. Soares later reportedly disobeyed CC orders to provide food to other zones and transfer populations to more secure areas. He began moves to purge Fretilin nationalists from his region, and may have contacted Indonesian forces. In November 1976, Soares and three associates were arrested by neighboring Fretilin commanders and subsequently executed. One of those executed was a pro-Fretilin liurai in the central-eastern sector; several other local liurai were Apodeti members. According to Xanana, “Our commanders constantly arrested the Apodetis and I kept freeing them. Finally they got tired of arresting them.”
The CC Standing Committee, which met on September 20, 1976, may have authorized the repression. It is not known if do Amaral attended. Again the ranks diverged. In mid-December, do Amaral allegedly met secretly with commanders in the absence of the local political cadres and “tempted them to disobey” central directives.113

The ideological gap widened, too. “At the end of 1976,” Xanana recalls, “I managed to get hold of a copy of The Thoughts of Chairman Mao. I read and re-read it, trying to understand Mao’s simple way of describing complex things.” By May 1977, “In groups we studied the ‘strategic questions’ of Mao and a change of war theory. The theory excited us in the planning of ideas and in strategic thinking, but it was a theory that required a heavy loss of life.”114

The internal divisions came to a head. Rejecting invitations from “all members” of the CC, President do Amaral boycotted the conference of the Supreme Council of Resistance of the CC Political Committee, held at Laline from May 8 to 20, 1977.115 Xanana says that “Xavier was happy in his kingdom and did not want to go to any more meetings.”116 Despite his absence, “sharp debate centered on a proposal to declare Fretilin a Marxist movement.” Xanana recalls that “we were still dazzled by a vision of a miraculous process of human redemption.”117 At mealtimes between political discussions, Nicolau Lobato “stopped talking. . . . No one prays to thank God for this food that the people have sweated to collect,” Nicolau said. Xanana recalls: “I understood how he was upset because although he was a Marxist he continued to be a religious person. . . . Nicolau stopped going to the meetings. He said he was sick.” He donated his family’s coffee plantations to the state. Hermengildo Alves complained, “Any day now, the state will get my wife’s gold earrings too,” while the “inveterate bohemian,” dos Anjos, told “endless anti-revolutionary jokes, which did not amuse the Department of Political and Ideological Orientation.” Finance Minister Sera Key “debated issues, making an effort to demonstrate his abilities as a political theorist. In fact he was the only one who livened up the meeting, until all the political commissars were told to sit around the same table and get organized. After that there was no more debate.”118

As Fretilin leaders debated Marxism, heavy Indonesian aerial bombardments began. Debate was apparently unresolved when approaching Indonesian troops prevented ratification of the proposal.119 According to Xanana, “Marxism was acclaimed,” but apparently this was done without formation of a revolutionary party.120 Indonesian military pressure only widened Fretilin’s internal divisions. The result was what Lobato would soon call a “profound crisis that has shaken our nation, hit our people, threatened our young state and undermined the unity of the Front.”121
Heightening differences seem reflected in successive statements by do Amaral, Lobato, and Fernandes, all broadcast by Fretilin radio and recorded in northern Australia. On May 20, 1977, the third anniversary of Fretilin’s founding, do Amaral, absent from the Laline meeting, claimed that his government had “organised the people to defend their country, so that they were not bunched up to be captured, but were spread out to contain the invasion. They did very well with only guns, bows and arrows, and no heavy artillery. Today, the fight continues against colonialism and neo-colonialism.”

Do Amaral thus emphasized the military and regional aspects of the struggle, and apparently avoided criticism of “imperialism.” Nor did he mention the Maoist notion of Soviet “social-imperialism.” By contrast, in a recorded interview broadcast the next month, Nicolau Lobato stated: “Always politics is [in] command. We don’t make war by war. Our armed struggle has a deeply political form and sense.” He called for “liberation of our people from the colonialists and imperialists.” This difference appears to have given rise to another issue, whether to seek negotiations. In successive interviews conducted by radio from Australia on June 18 and 19, 1977, Alarico Fernandes insisted on a slogan that may have required reaffirmation in recent debate: “negotiations with the corrupt Jakarta government, never,” and “negotiations with the enemy, never.”

Who had called for negotiations was still unclear.

Ideological discussions continued. In nightly meetings during August 1977, Vicente Sa’he and Xanana prepared “for the time when a revolutionary party would be formed.” Xanana recalled, “We would be Maoists. At least they were Maoists.” Sa’he, who admired Albania and Cuba, asked Xanana if he would agree to join the party. Xanana says he replied, “No.”

On August 7, 1977, “the traitor Domenges Simoes” tried to assassinate Alarico Fernandes. Do Amaral got the blame, and on September 7, 1977, he was arrested by Lobato and Fernandes, possibly after avoiding another Supreme Council meeting. “In circumstances that are still far from clear, he had apparently sought to arrange a compromise with the occupying forces.” Lobato announced: “Against the mistakes of comrades, we use the weapon of criticism. Against the enemies, traitors and sellers of the homeland, we use the criticism of weapons. To do that we must strengthen the repressive apparatus of our State.” Lobato’s faction expelled two CC members from central East Timor and five cadres from the same region. Other cadres and an alleged agent “infiltrated in the Department of Information and National Security” were arrested and “seriously interrogated.” Lobato announced that confessions had been “dragged out of the prisoners” and that the Remexio Zone secretary was “a traitor already under our control in a safe place.”
At a meeting of the CC Political Committee in Aikurus, Fretilin education minister Hamis Basserwan now assumed “responsibility for the ideological training of the Fretilin Central Committee members.” Xanana Gusmao recalls Basserwan earlier confiding: “Don’t think, Xanana, that we are well-versed in theory. In Lisbon, I spent most of my time with the Portuguese Communist Party painting slogans on the walls!”

In the east, CC member Sera Key returned from Aikurus and told his subordinate Xanana of the purges and atrocities committed there. Confused but apparently convinced of the need for “revolutionary violence,” Key launched an investigation of local “counter-revolutionaries”. But at a meeting of four CC members, Xanana reports challenging him: “I cannot accept this violence. I cannot accept that a member of the Central Committee would inflict torture.” Xanana claims that he managed to persuade Key to let him conduct his own investigations, and that he eventually freed the prisoners.

Despite the violent purge of his followers, do Amaral and his associate Arsenio Horta survived nearly a year in Fretilin custody. On August 30, 1978, they were captured by Indonesian troops during the battle for Remexio. Do Amaral was taken to Dili, where he called on Fretilin to surrender. (He spent the next twenty-two years in Bali and Jakarta.) Then came the capture or surrender of his former rival, Information Minister Fernandes, on December 2, 1978. One of Fernandes’ last radio transmissions announced that he and several others had broken with the CC. In turn, Fretilin now also accused him of plotting a coup with “a correlation of forces in the central-north sector.” This region had been Amaral’s stronghold. Close to Dili and to the center of Indonesian power, in 1977–78 the north-central sector appears to have favored a succession of local and national leaders seeking compromise with Jakarta.

At his surrender, Fernandes named the six “intransigent” leaders of the continuing Fretilin resistance: President Lobato, the new vice president and justice minister Mau Lear, National Political Commissioner Vicente Sa’he, Education Minister Hamis Basserwan, Economy Vice Minister Helio Pina, and Commissioner Carlos Cesar. One of their last bases was Mt. Matebian in the Eastern Zone, where thirty thousand people were holding out. Xanana arrived there with many others from the island’s eastern tip in September 1978. He describes what he saw: “I visited all the front lines engaged in combat. There was no room for the people. There were bombardments, explosions, death, blood, smoke, dust, and interminable queues of people waiting for their turn to try to get a bit of water for the children. . . . There was total lack of control. . . . The fighter planes were sowing the seeds of death all day long.”

The base fell to Indonesian encirclement on November 22, 1978. That night, Xanana and some troops fought their way out to the east. Others
escaped west. Fretilin was now unable to defend its even larger base area, the Natarbora plain, with a population of sixty thousand people near the south coast, commanded by Vice President Mau Lear and Vicente Sa’he. Indonesian forces occupied Natarbora in December. Then, Nicolau Lobato was surrounded near Maubisse. On December 31, the Fretilin president was killed after a six-hour battle with Indonesian forces led by Suharto’s future son-in-law, Prabowo. Twenty other Fretilin leaders and troops fell with him, including Deputy Defense Minister Guido Soares. Mau Lear took his place as Fretilin president. Vicente Sa’he took command of its military wing, Falantil—after escaping the battlefield with Hamis Basserwan. Mau Lear was tracked down and executed on February 2, 1979. Later that month, pursuing Indonesian troops wounded Sa’he in the leg. He ordered his fleeing comrades to leave him behind. Basserwan, Pina, and Cesar all disappeared. In the east, Xanana sent a young Falantil commander, Taur Matan Ruak, to the central sector to “find the Resistance Executive,” but his unit was betrayed and trapped near Viqueque. Ruak surrendered on March 31. He managed to escape after twenty-three days and would later become Falantil deputy chief of staff.

From September 1977 to February 1979, the Fretilin central command was virtually destroyed. Only three of the fifty-two CC members survived, all in the Eastern Zone: minister of finance and political commissar Sera Key, Xanana Gusmao (chief of the eastern sector, Ponte Leste), and Mau Hunu (deputy secretary of the eastern region command). David Alex, who had commanded elite companies until the fall of Mt. Matebian, also remained active in the east, his forces intact, including fourteen troops from his native village there. Budiardjo writes, “Although losses suffered by Fretilin in the eastern sector were enormous, the resistance movement there was in better shape than in the border and central regions.”

It was here that Xanana now began the slow, painful process of rebuilding. In December 1978–January 1979, he recalls, “for a month and a half I traveled through the hamlets, making contact with the people.” An Indonesian-appointed village official hosted a secret meeting with a former Fretilin CC member, Joao Branco, and they “settled a few ideas on the continuity of the struggle. In February 1979 I summoned Txay and Kilik so we could assess the situation.” Also, “The Commanders who were supposed to be in the Centre Region joined me.” They reported that the center was in “chaos,” as was Viqueque region, where the violent Hermengildo Alves had treated them with characteristic “suspicion.” A CC member from the center–east, Solan, and his ill wife, as well as “Olo Kasa and his weak wife, and Sera Key and his wife,” along with their escorts, were all “isolated from each other and abandoned by their forces. Sera Key recommended to his two commanders that the forces
that had returned from the Centre Region, and those that could not get through, be put under my charge. He would go to the Centre to try to find the Resistance Executive.” Xanana toured the east, locating bands led by Mau Hodu, Taur Matan Ruak, Mauk Moruk, David Alex, Lay Kana, Olo Gari, Fera Lafaek, and Sabica. But the Indonesians captured Solan and Olo Kasa. They massacred Lay Kana, “the best commander” in the east, with his company and other defectors.152

In March 1979, the top five surviving Fretilin military officers (Falantil operational commander Mauk Muruk, Kilik Wae Gae, Olo Gari, Nelo, and Freddy) met with the five senior political leaders (Xanana, Mau Hunu, Mau Hodu, Bere Malay Laka, and Taxy) at Titilari–Laivai in the central-eastern sector, “to analyse the causes and consequences of the military collapse, and to devise adequate measures for the reorganization of the resistance.”153

Sera Key set out from the east in April to make contact with the remaining resistance bands in the central sector. He and his wife were soon captured, “sick, abandoned and betrayed by the last forces from the East Centre sector which had also surrendered.” Indonesian troops reportedly took Sera Key to Dili by helicopter and dumped him in the sea. In July and December, Xanana and Mau Hunu sent out further missions, but both returned without encountering surviving resistance groups further west.154 In May 1980, Xanana took half a company of sixty troops from the east to the western border and back. A Fretilin unit staged a spectacular attack on the Dili TV station on June 10. By October, Xanana had made contact with continuing resistance forces in Kablake near the border and in the central sector. On Christmas Day, Falantil attacked Baucau, the territory’s second city.155

Fretilin was eventually able to organize a national conference, from March 1 to 8, 1981, at Laculta in the central-east region. Xanana was elected president, Kilik Wae Gae became chief of staff, and Mau Hunu became deputy chief-of-staff. Bere Malay Laka was named secretary of information. They reported to the conference that Fretilin had lost 79 percent of the members of its Supreme Command, 80 percent of its troops, 90 percent of its weapons, all its population bases, and all the channels of communication between its scattered groups and with the outside world.156

**Famine and Mass Murder**

According to Indonesian documents that Fretilin forces captured in 1982, “as a result of all the unrest, many village heads have been replaced, whilst many new villages have emerged.” The experience of two eastern villages is instructive: “With the upheavals, the inhabitants “fled into the bush,” returning only in May 1979, when they were “resettled” in a district town. “But this led
to their being unable to grow food on their own land, so that food shortages have occurred.”

Famine ravaged East Timor in 1979. Indonesian aerial bombardment of their homes and cultivated gardens in the hill areas had forced many Timorese to surrender in the lowlands, but food was scarce there. Indonesia’s control eventually expanded, and its counts of the Timorese population rose from 329,000 to as many as 522,000 in mid-1979. More than 120,000 Timorese remained missing, mostly victims of the famine and the continuing Indonesian-instigated massacres and repression. Taylor reports that on November 23, 1978, Indonesian troops shot five hundred people who surrendered to them the day after the fall of Mt. Matebian; soon afterward there was a similar massacre of three hundred in Taipo, and in two further incidents in the east in April–May 1979, Indonesian forces murdered 97 and 118 people. Also in the east, Indonesians massacred Joao Branco and forty others at the end of 1979. In a September 1981 massacre southeast of Dili, four hundred people died, mostly women and children. In August 1983, sixty men, women, and children were tied up and bulldozed to death at Malim Luro near the south coast. On August 21–22, troops burned alive at least eighty people in the southern village of Kraras, and then made a “clean-sweep” of the neighboring area, in which another five hundred died. Of East Timor’s twenty-thousand-strong ethnic Chinese minority, survivors numbered only “a few thousand” by 1985.

As fighting continued, Indonesia’s special forces worked to recruit Timorese paramilitary combat teams, predecessors of the militias responsible for widespread massacres in the 1990s. In the first two months of 1982, the team Railakan I, comprising fifty-two troops, killed eight Falantil rebels and captured thirty-two. In an attack on Xanana’s forces in September, Railakan I killed nine more Fretilin troops.

Regional Resurgence

In the early 1980s, despite devastating blows, Timorese resistance still challenged Jakarta’s forces, who termed Fretilin “gangs of security disruptors” (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, or GPK). In 1982, Indonesian commanders in Dili acknowledged in confidential documents that “despite the heavy pressure and the disadvantageous conditions under which they operate, the GPK has nevertheless been able to hold out in the bush.” For instance, from just six villages of the Eastern Zone, 293 inhabitants were “still in the bush.” After seven years of occupation, Fretilin “support networks” still existed “in all settlements, the villages as well as the towns.” These “underground networks are closely related to customs and to the family system.” Jakarta aimed “to obliterate the classic GPK areas” and “crush the GPK remnants to their roots.”
The conquered territory must “eventually be completely clean of the influence and presence of the guerrillas.” Deportations continued; in one sector of the Eastern Zone, thirty more villages were resettled in 1982.166

The Indonesian commander in Dili, Colonel A. Sahala Rajagukguk, revealed to his officers that nine Fretilin bands continued to operate. Of four “small, unorganized groups,” one even operated near West Timor and Dili, “in the border district of Ermera, and in the districts of Dili, Liquica, and Ailiu.” Summarizing the activities of all these groups, Colonel Rajagukguk concluded that “they can meet together at predetermined places. . . . Meetings in the eastern region can be held in the regions of Koaliu, Matahean, Macadique or Builo. On such occasions there is a very sizeable concentration of forces in one place.” He went on: “It is in the eastern sector that people’s support is most militant and most difficult [for Indonesian forces] to expose. This is because of the very strong, close family ties and also because it has been possible for the GPK to consolidate its political leadership in this region for several years. This is also because a large part of the population in this region fled to the mountains and only came down to the new villages at the beginning of 1979. In such circumstances, the GPK has consciously chosen the eastern region as its hinterland and reserve base.”167

Normalizing the Occupation, 1983–99

In 1982, Indonesian intelligence knew most of the surviving Fretilin leaders, naming Mauk Moruk, Mau Hunu, David Alex, Kilik, Txay, and Loro Timur Anan.168 If Jakarta was as yet unaware of Xanana’s leadership position, they learned of it within a year. A new Indonesian army commander, General Mohammed Yusuf, agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations with Fretilin. Xanana then held two days of talks with his Indonesian counterparts, on March 21 and 23, 1983. Jakarta later abandoned the negotiations, but the cease-fire was a temporary acknowledgment of Fretilin’s continuing military challenge. Fighting resumed, with Falantil estimated to be fielding up to one thousand guerrillas in several areas. Indonesian reinforcements in 1984 brought troop levels back up to fourteen thousand to twenty thousand. Railakan I, a locally recruited special forces paramilitary team, increased in size from fifty-two to ninety men. From March to December 1984, this team alone killed thirty-two Falantil rebels and captured twelve. As the war raged on, Suharto declared a state of emergency in East Timor on September 9, 1985.169

Douglas Kammen sees the 1983 cease-fire as Jakarta’s “tentative, indeed abortive, first attempt” to normalize its control of East Timor and secure foreign recognition for its integration of the territory. However, this was accom-
panied by “alternative forms of violence,” such as increasing Indonesian use of East Timorese combat “teams.” Suharto made a second attempt in 1988, when he declared East Timor’s “equal status” with Indonesia’s other twenty-six provinces. Jakarta announced the “opening” of the territory and the introduction of Operation Smile. The 1989 papal visit followed. But, Kammen says, “greater openness was accompanied by the heightened use of covert operations and terror,” especially against Fretilin’s new strategy of nonviolent urban protest, but also a new rural offensive aiming to capture Xanana, who moved secretly into Dili in February 1991. In August 1991, Indonesian forces in East Timor totaled 20,700, including 11,000 “external” troops on rotation there from other provinces, 4,800 “territorial” or local troops, and other members of the Indonesian armed forces. Samuel Moore writes, “The East Timorese continued to live under one of the most intensive military occupations of modern history,” with ten to fourteen troops stationed in each village and neighborhood, a soldier for every thirty-eight civilians. In Dili on November 12, 1991, the army gunned down and bayoneted three hundred Timorese funeral marchers at the Santa Cruz cemetery, an event secretly filmed by a journalist, bringing East Timor to world attention. A year later, Xanana was discovered and arrested. Still the resistance continued, and urban unrest mounted.

In May 1990, Jakarta had replaced its combat Security Operations Command (Koopskam) with a new East Timor Operations Implementation Command (Kolakops). In response to international condemnation of the Santa Cruz massacre, external battalions began to be withdrawn and replaced by local territorial troops, and a third attempt at normalization was made with the liquidation of Kolakops in April 1993. All security responsibilities, including command of the nine external battalions then on rotation in the territory, were now assigned to the local territorial command, Korem 164, headquartered in Dili but “entirely under the direction of non–East Timorese.” By April 1994, when the number of battalions under Korem 164 was reduced to seven, the military had begun forming paramilitary units such as the “Young Guards Upholding Integration” (Gada Paksi), which had eleven hundred members by 1996. These militia forces expanded rapidly. By 1995, the former commander of the Railakan I paramilitary team headed a three-hundred-strong militia. By 1997–98, there were twelve such paramilitary teams with four thousand to eight thousand members. Also in 1997–98, the number of regular battalions under Korem 164 again increased, to thirteen. By August 1998, the total number of Indonesian troops in the territory was 21,600, including 8,000 external troops.

Suharto fell from power in May 1998 and pressure mounted on Jakarta to hold a referendum in the territory. This brought a sharp increase in militia
activity. The army sponsored the creation of several new militia forces at the end of 1998.\footnote{175}

The Fretilin leadership had suffered major losses by the time of Suharto’s fall. Falantil’s Operational Commander Mauk Muruk, who had surrendered in July 1985, spent the next four years in the psychiatric isolation ward of a Jakarta military hospital.\footnote{176} In June 1990, Mau Hudo became Fretilin vice chairperson, but he was captured in January 1992. After the arrest of Xanana in November the same year, David Alex became deputy chief of staff of Falantil. He was wounded and captured by Indonesian troops in June 1997 and is presumed dead. His successor was Konis Santana, who was killed in an accident in March 1998 and replaced by Taur Matan Ruak, who had been deputy chief of staff in the mid-1980s.\footnote{177} But despite these setbacks, six hundred to nine hundred veteran Fretilin troops fought on in the hills, joined by six hundred recruits in 1998 alone. Taur Matan Ruak’s force of fifteen hundred welcomed the United Nations peacekeepers when they arrived in the territory in September 1999.\footnote{178}

Despite its military losses, Fretilin maintained a broad political base. In 1992, an Indonesian intelligence report entitled “Data on Disturbed Villages” categorized only 163 of East Timor’s 442 villages as peaceful and secure. Seventy-nine villages were coded “Red,” or “disturbed” (possibly Fretilin-controlled). In 1997, Korem 164 intelligence estimated that the GPK “clandestine front” had about fifteen hundred members in the capital, and in 1999 they were estimated to have six thousand members throughout the territory.\footnote{179}

In September 1998, in a historic reconciliation, all five East Timorese parties involved in the civil war of 1975 joined forces under the new umbrella organization, the Timorese Council of National Resistance (CNRT), and elected the political prisoner Xanana Gusmao as president.\footnote{180} A year later, 79 percent of Timorese voted for independence in the UN-organized referendum.

**Genocidal Counterinsurgency**

Jakarta was unable to achieve its goal of conquest. But what underlying ideology justified genocide in the attempt? In Remexio and Aileu, where “everyone over the age of three was shot” in early 1976, Indonesian forces explained that the local people had been “infected with the seeds of Fretilin.” After the September 1981 Lacluta massacre, a soldier allegedly explained, “When you clean your field, don’t you kill all the snakes, the small and large alike?” In 1984, a new territory-wide military campaign aimed at what one commander called the obliteration of Fretilin “to the fourth generation.”\footnote{181} The mixture of biological and agricultural metaphors is common in genocidal regimes.\footnote{182} While
the killings of more than 500,000 communists in Indonesia in 1965–66 had not been accompanied by ethnic massacres targeting minorities, in the territorial expansion a decade later, Jakarta’s repressive forces did single out the Chinese of East Timor for “selective killings.”

Indonesia’s targeting of Fretilin as a multigenerational kinship group also resembles genocide. In early 1999, as the UN referendum approached, Indonesian military and militia commanders threatened to “liquidate . . . all the pro-independence people, parents, sons, daughters, and grandchildren.” At a meeting in Bali in February 1999, Indonesian commanders Adam Damiri and Mahidin Simbolon ordered militias “to eliminate all of the CNRT leaders and sympathizers.” On February 16, meeting with militia leaders, Lieutenant-Colonel Yahyat Sudrajad called for the killing of pro-independence leaders, their children, and their grandchildren. “Not a single member of their families was to be left alive, the colonel told the meeting.”

Jakarta’s governor of the territory, Abilio Soares, ordered that “priests and nuns should be killed.” (In 2002, Soares was convicted in a Jakarta court.) Militia leaders called on their followers to “conduct a cleansing of the traitors of integration. Capture them and kill them.” Tono Suratman, Korem 164 commander in Dili, warned, “if the pro-independents do win . . . all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23 years ago.” A May 1999 Indonesian army document ordered that “massacres should be carried out from village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-independence supporters win.” The East Timorese independence movement “should be eliminated from its leadership down to its roots.”

Conclusion

Cambodia and East Timor were both subjected to genocide in 1975–79. Foreign occupying forces from Indonesia perpetrated the genocide in East Timor, while foreign occupying forces from Vietnam ended the indigenous Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia. The perpetrator regimes in Jakarta and Phnom Penh enjoyed diplomatic support from the United States, which continued after the genocides, including training and arming the Indonesian military. Until the 1990s, Washington supported Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor and voted in the UN for the exiled Khmer Rouge to represent Cambodia. Maoist ideological influence on Fretilin in East Timor and on the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia produced political purges, repression, and murder in both cases. Yet in the Cambodian case, Khmer Rouge military aggression against Vietnam, supported by China for geopolitical reasons, combined with a virulent Khmer Rouge racism that targeted foreigners and minorities for extermination, resulting in
genocide. To the Maoist-influenced Fretilin regime, however, genocide came from without, in the name of anticommunism. East Timor did not attack Indonesia, but was the victim of aggression. Maoism functioned there within a multicultural nationalist party resisting foreign invasion and genocide. The political and geopolitical factors favoring genocide varied, and in each case regionalisms undercut the genocidists and the resistance, while racism and expansionism played major roles in both tragedies.

Notes


32. Dunn, *Timor*, 181–82.


45. Dunn, *Timor*, 5.


49. Tanter, “Military Situation.”


61. Gusmao, *To Resist*, 22 n. 31; 32; 39 n. 68; 43; Budiardjo et al., *War*, 61.
66. For accounts by priests living in Fretilin areas until 1979, see Taylor, *East Timor*, 81–82.
68. “Speech of Nicolau Lobato,” *passim*.
74. Estimates for 1974 are 635,000 (Jill Jolliffe, *Cover-Up* [Melbourne: Scribe, 2001], 46), and 689,000 (the Timorese Catholic Church). Taylor, *East Timor*, 89–90, 98, 203.
76. Budiardjo et al., *War*, 201.
82. Dunn, *Timor*, 286, 303.
85. Dunn, *Timor*, 303, 293.
86. Dunn, *Timor*, 303.
Chapter 9

88. Dunn, *Timor*, 310, based on “Notes on East Timor,” in Dunn’s possession.
94. Dunn, *Timor*, 4, 63.
102. Here we must rely largely on accounts of do Amaral’s rivals and successors, not all of whom survived. Hopefully do Amaral will provide a memoir of 1974–77.
112. Gusmao, *To Resist*, 44.
121. “Speech of Nicolau Lobato,” 11.
126. “Speech of Nicolau Lobato,” 9, 3.
129. The CC members were from Manatuto and Lakular; the zone cadres were Laclo and Remexio secretaries and their deputies, and the Laklubar secretary. “Speech of Nicolau Lobato,” 1, 3.
140. Budiardjo et al., *War*, 33.
143. Budiardjo et al., *War*, 33, 66.
147. Xanana received a report that “Cesar Maulaka was in the South Centre region, in the area of Alas, but much of the information was contradictory.” Gusmao, *To Resist*, 63.
148. Gusmao, *To Resist*, 60 n. 94; 57 n. 89.
149. Gusmao, *To Resist*, 25 n. 42; 152. Gusmao says Txay was the third surviving CC member. Budiardjo et al., *War*, 67, 70, says it was Sera Key.
150. Gusmao, *To Resist*, 59 n. 92; 60; Budiardjo et al., *War*, 196, 213.
156. Budiardjo et al., *War*, xii, 67–70.
164. Captured Indonesian documents, English translations of which are in Budiardjo et al., *War*, 82.
168. Budiardjo et al., *War*, 177, 196.
176. Gama, "War in the Hills," 103.
186. Tomas Goncalves, former head of the PPPI militia, quoted in Evans, "Revealed," 54. Andrew Fowler reported that in early 1999, pro-Indonesia commanders


