

## Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea

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*I have been asked by the editors to explain why I have "changed my mind" about Kampuchea.*

*As can be seen from a comparison with what is now known about recent Kampuchean history and my article "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia" (Australian Outlook, Dec. 1976), I was late in realizing the extent of the tragedy in Kampuchea after 1975 and Pol Pot's responsibility for it. It is quite clear that I was wrong about an important aspect of Kampuchean communism: the brutal authoritarian trend within the revolutionary movement after 1973 was not simply a grassroots reaction, and expression of popular outrage at the killing and destruction of the countryside by US bombs, although that helped it along decisively. There can be no doubting that the evidence also points clearly to a systematic use of violence against the population by that chauvinist section of the revolutionary movement that was led by Pol Pot. In my opinion this violence was employed in the service of a nationalist revivalism that had little concern for the living conditions of the Khmer people, or with the humanitarian socialist ideals that had inspired the broader Kampuchean revolutionary movement.*

*One notable error I made was to regard Kampuchean ultra-nationalist sentiment as somehow progressive, simply because it was understandable in the light of the damage done to the country by foreigners. I quoted a junior official of the Lon Nol government who had said that he would be prepared to accept a communist government in Kampuchea provided it was "really independent" and that "domination by the Vietnamese, whether communist or not, could only bring us misery." This statement has been invalidated by history: the "really independent" (although propped up by Chinese military aid) Pol Pot group sowed unprecedented misery in Kampuchea, leading to the death of a huge section of the population and forcing the rest to submit to enormous sacrifices in the name of building a powerful nation. And, subsequently, what the official would no doubt have called "Vietnamese domination" since January 1979 has been generally welcomed by the Kampuchean people. And now the defeated remnants of the Pol Pot groups are massacring large numbers of Kampuchean villagers who don't want to support the racist crusade against the Vietnamese instituted by Pol Pot (who in Paris in 1952 had signed his handwritten contributions to a Khmer student magazine as the "Original Khmer").\* Clearly, the "nationalism" expressed by the official I quoted is not the force most aligned with the interests of the people in this tragic equation.*

*Further, I was too willing to believe that information from the most important sources about post-1975 Kampuchea, the refugees and the government radio, could be reconciled. I was unprepared for the vastness of the gulf that came to separate them, and for the propaganda emanating from Phnom Penh during those years, the cynicism of which was eventually exposed by discussions I had with many working class Kampuchians who had lived under that government and had no reason to invent stories.*

*Also, the many proven falsehoods spread in the Western Press led to preoccupation with the correction of specific lies or distortions (fake atrocity photographs, fake interview, etc.).\*\* While such correction is important to anyone sorting through the evidence, it does not by itself establish the truth about the actual situation in Kampuchea. As George Orwell pointed out in reference to atrocity stories about the Spanish Civil War, those whose interests are against social change will always spread disinformation about revolutions; but these stories are irrelevant to the truth, neither its identity nor its opposite. It is up to those interested in the truth to establish it positively.*

*The most reliable source about the plight of the vast, predominantly peasant, working class in Kampuchea in 1975-6 was working class refugees, carefully questioned in a democratic atmosphere. But relatively few of these people fled their country in 1975-6, and they mostly came from one specific region. Further, Thai officials allowed only pro-Western researchers to interview refugees systematically and without the constraining presence of authorities, and these people paid little or no attention to gathering evidence from peasants or workers. So it was difficult for a non-specialist, or even a specialist lacking resources and suitable political connections, to track the real direction of the Kampuchean revolution as far as the vast majority of the country's people were concerned.*

*Finally, in 1975-6 the direction to be taken by the Kampuchean revolution had not yet, in my opinion, been fully resolved in Kampuchea itself. Chanthou Boua and I have in 1979 interviewed a significant number of Kampuchean refugees, many of whom state that, in 1975 or 1976 or both years, the peasants in the villages they lived in gave support to the revolution. Many others say the opposite; here we have evidence of divisions in the revolution which have hitherto been greatly ignored. But all the refugees point out that in late 1976 or early 1977 (following Pol Pot's return to power after being briefly outmanoeuvred in Phnom Penh), where this peasant support had existed it changed to bitter hatred as food rations were cut, executions of recalcitrants increased, children were separated from their parents, and daily life became more rigorously regimented. In villages where the peasants had in 1975-6 been motivated by fear of the revolutionaries as much as, or more than, by support for them, life also became noticeably harsher. The political situation in Kampuchea clearly changed from late 1976, and very much for the worse. I personally didn't pick this up before early 1978.*

*Also in early 1978, a number of disturbing facts about recent Kampuchean foreign policy became known: premeditated, systematic Kampuchean clashes with Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. After a brief but hopeless attempt to see the situation*

*Kampuchea was in as a product of a Soviet desire for world hegemony, I decided that Kampuchea's external relations could not be divorced from its disastrous internal plight. It was quite clear that Pol Pot was manufacturing foreign aggression to try to distract the attention of his people and his oponents inside the country from the horrific problems they faced, for which Pol Pot and his team were largely responsible.*

*Support for the Pol Pot regime may or may not be deemed logical from deductive argument concerning its "struggle for independence." But what might give such argument credibility, a detailed convincing analysis showing the regime's internal policy to have served the interests of the Kampuchean workers and peasants, is still lacking. And having talked at length with workers and peasants who lived in many provinces of Kampuchea under Pol Pot through 1977-8, I am certain it will never be produced.*

In December 1978, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* discussed the prospects of the newly-formed United Front for National Salvation (UFNS) in Kampuchea led by Heng Samrin. It quoted Western intelligence sources as saying that in villages where it was established, one of the first moves the UFNS made was to demolish the communal dining halls built by the Pol Pot forces. The sources commented: "surprisingly, the Front seems to be getting popular support." <sup>1</sup>

After the overthrow of the Pol Pot Regime the next month, the *Review* quoted the same intelligence sources to the effect that in some areas the local Kampuchean population had risen up in "spontaneous and scattered uprisings" against Pol Pot, and were assisting the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin troops in their attempts to mop up the defeated forces and unearth arms caches. <sup>2</sup> Other sources confirm this, specifying one particular uprising of this kind at Cheom Khsanh in Preah Vihear province.

Many refugees who have fled to various parts of Thailand because of the war in Kampuchea also report that the population welcomed the Vietnamese troops and those of the UFNS army. These troops established good relations with the villagers, they say.

Several peasants from northern Kampuchea were interviewed by international observers in the Surin refugee camp in February. An Hian, 22, said that, in her village, "the Vietnamese stayed four days. They did not demand food but distributed cooking instruments so villagers could eat individually if they wanted to . . . I do not want to return to Kampuchea because Pol Pot might come back to power," she added.

Suon Sophoat, 25, also said that the Vietnamese "distributed food and ended communal dining." Non Loc, 76, agreed and added that "they also distributed other goods to the people." He said that Pol Pot troops had killed 140 people in his village of Kouk Mon since 1975; he did not trust them when they asked the peasants to attend a meeting after the Vietnamese troops had withdrawn. So he fled to Thailand.

Hong Var, whom Chanthou Boua and I interviewed at length in Aranyaprathet on April 2, fled to Thailand with her two daughters and 204 others on 12 March. She said every one of the peasants and people of other backgrounds in her village hated the Pol Pot regime bitterly; especially after the year 1978, during which she said half the population of the village, Andaung Khlong, died or were executed. When they arrived, the Vietnamese troops were welcomed, and did not mistreat the people. There was a feast; the Vietnamese distributed food and medicine, and re-established freedom of travel. Then they withdrew.

Fifty or sixty families of former Phnom Penh residents decided to return home and set out after them. These people were ambushed twice by Pol Pot troops not far from Andaung Khlong, and nearly all of them were killed, Var said.

Pol Pot troops returned to the village. Not long after, Var managed to join the people of the nearby village of Srae Memai, who fled to Thailand almost to the last person. In Srae Memai, 17 men had been executed by the Pol Pot forces on their return.

William Shawcross interviewed some Kampuchean refugees in another camp in Aranyaprathet, in March 1979. He reported:

*The Vietnamese appear anxious to win the hearts and minds of the people and seem to behave well toward them. They distribute rice and cooking utensils so that families can once again eat en famille instead of en masse. They also either appoint or supervise the election of new village officials. Refugees give the impression that these changes are widely welcomed, despite the fact that they are imposed by the ancient enemy of the Khmers.*

*But the Vietnamese are stretched too thin apparently to stay in the villages they have occupied. Invariably they move on, sometimes leaving behind a radio for emergency calls. This is ineffective. The Khmer Rouge then return, discover from spies they have left behind what has happened, kill those who collaborated (or were elected to official posts under Vietnamese guidance), take away the food and then force the people to march into the jungle . . . This pattern seems to have been repeated frequently, at least in the west of Cambodia.<sup>3</sup>*

In an analysis published in *Le Monde*<sup>4</sup> in May, based on interviews with other refugees, Francois Ponchaud concurred with this. But according to "several refugees," he added, "the Vietnamese are proceeding to empty the country of all the wealth which might still remain." This has not yet been confirmed. Finally, Ponchaud noted that "most of the refugees tell of the bad treatment of Khmer women by the Vietnamese." I asked a Bangkok Kampuchea-watcher, who works in the embassy of a country which has not

exactly enjoyed close relations with the Vietnamese communists in the past twenty years, about this. He said there had been cases of rape by Vietnamese soldiers in Kampuchea, but that it was not a general phenomenon: one Vietnamese soldier was ordered shot by his superiors for raping a Khmer woman, he said. He concluded:

*"I don't accuse the Vietnamese of atrocities, and that includes starving the people."*

Khmer and ethnic Chinese refugees from Kampuchea, interviewed in the Aranyaprathet camps by Chanthou Boua and James Pringle on May 21, provided some more recent information about the looming food problem. One of them said:

*There will certainly be famine. Everyone will die, starving to death in the next three or four months. It is the farming season now. There is rain everywhere, but no one can get into the fields to do anything. The Vietnamese told us to go and do the farming, but there is still much fighting going on, and also mines in the rice fields laid by the Pol Pot forces. . . .*

Another refugee, questioned about such mines, said: "Pol Pot laid them." The answer to the question: "Who is responsible for all that has happened in Cambodia?" was unanimous: "Pol Pot . . . Pol Pot . . . Pol Pot. . . ." But opinions were divided as to what the new government was doing about the food problem. One refugee said that "the Vietnamese are too busy [fighting Pol Pot] to solve the food problem." Another said: "We have seen planes and trucks transporting our food away," while yet another noted: "I have not seen the Vietnamese taking rice out of Cambodia." The refugees expressed general agreement with those who said:

*The Khmer Rouge killed a person just like killing an ant. . . .  
Pol Pot is worse than Hitler — a fascist. . . .  
The Vietnamese did not give us any rice, but they did not hurt us.*

When asked whether there had been any signs that the Heng Samrin forces might kill them, they replied: "They were nice to us, but it is communism."

More than a month after the change of government, a secret meeting is reported to have taken place between representatives of the Thai Communist Party and those of the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea. According to a detailed account in the Thai weekly *Thai Nikorn*, the meeting, among other things, "took account of the fact that about 80% of the Kampuchean people were in support of the Heng Samrin group." The meeting further noted that:

*A great number of Pol Pot soldiers have secret contacts with the Heng Samrin Government, partly because they are satisfied to an extent with the policies of the Heng Samrin*

*government in granting certain freedoms relating to property, place of residence, etc.*

*Not a few Pol Pot soldiers say that if the Heng Samrin government could push the Vietnamese soldiers out of Kampuchean territory immediately, they would support the Heng Samrin government 100% immediately. But if the Heng Samrin government could not do that, their support for it would only be limited.*

Interestingly, according to *Thai Nikorn*, the meeting then went on to discuss the Khmer Serei, anti-communist Kampuchean guerrillas based in Thailand.

*Quite a number of Khmer Serei could not bring themselves to cooperate with Pol Pot in fighting against Heng Samrin according to the advice of some large countries. They are very angry about Pol Pot's massacres and confiscation of property and are satisfied to a certain extent with the democratic policies of the Heng Samrin group. Therefore they secretly and openly cooperate with the Heng Samrin government concerning the activities of the extreme rightwing groups in Thailand and of a certain number of big countries on the matter of Kampuchea, by giving detailed information speedily to the Heng Samrin government (about this) . . . .<sup>5</sup>*

Also in February, the Khmer Serei themselves drew up a report on the situation in Kampuchea. According to this report:

*The Heng Samrin government has given the inhabitants back their freedom. The people have been authorized to leave the cooperatives where they had been locked up by the Khmer Rouge and to return to their villages.*

*The Vietnamese were accompanied by interpreters or small groups of soldiers from the new people's army. . . In general they conducted themselves well and even distributed small supplies and medicine to the people. They urged the villagers to elect a new village committee and often facilitated arming of self-defence units . . . The villagers (now) work half a day for the state on collective tasks such as planting rice and irrigation work. The rest of the day they can work for themselves . . . In general the people appear happy.<sup>6</sup>*

It is significant that before this report was released, the Khmer Serei leadership had already decided to fight alongside the Pol Pot troops against Heng Samrin's government and the Vietnamese.<sup>7</sup>

Thai military sources, too, reported in February that "most Kampuchians are now in favour of the new regime led by Heng Samrin."<sup>8</sup>

Two non-communist journalists, Harish Chandola and Jean-Pierre Gallois, visited several provinces of Kampuchea in late March. Both reported evidence of the fact that the Pol Pot regime had been murderous. They also reported that the roads in eastern Kampuchea were "filled" with people returning to their homes after being freed from places where they had been sent to work by the Pol Pot regime.<sup>9</sup> Gallois, who said he was able to talk to a number of Kampuchians unsupervised, wrote in a report from Phnom Penh:

*The Cambodians who have returned to this broken city feel that they have been abandoned by the non-communist world. They cannot believe that all the Western countries are continuing to recognise the legality and existence of the Pol Pot government. They cannot understand how the United Nations can disregard their views and try to destroy their only outside support without finding a replacement to protect them against a return of Pol Pot. In Chang Chamres village, at the gates of Phnom Penh, the same question came back dozens of times: "And what are France and United States doing?"*

*Every night the people of Chang Chamres listen to Western broadcasts in the hope of a reply. The Cambodia that survived Pol Pot is like a dismembered body coming back to life. . . . Meeting today the people of Phnom Penh, the visitor leaves convinced that the Cambodian people feel, at least at present, only gratitude and reassurance over the Vietnamese presence here.<sup>10</sup>*

Chandola, for his part, reported that "there was no shortage of Kampuchians anxious to assure me they'd been saved by the Vietnamese."<sup>11</sup> French journalist Roger Pick received the same impression during a later visit to Phnom Penh.<sup>12</sup>

In May I spoke at length with an ethnic Khmer peasant from a Thai border village, who asked not to be identified. He said he had crossed into Kampuchea for five days in April, to search for relatives who used to live on the other side of the border. He visited Samron, the capital of Kampuchea's Oddar Meanchey province, as well as the village of Trabek and other places.

He said he had discovered that all but two of his relatives had died or been killed during the Pol Pot period. The surviving two had joined the UFNS army, which he said was well-liked by the population and in good military control of the Province. Asked

about Vietnamese troops, he said he couldn't say anything about them since he had been unable to communicate with them.

In Samrong, this peasant said, mass graves were now being unearthed; these contained the bodies of victims of Pol Pot soldiers, with their hands still bound at the wrists. Many of the dead were monks. Now, he said, the Heng Samrin government was encouraging the practice of Buddhism once again; this was a popular move, he thinks. He said people had told him they were eating better in 1979 than they had in 1978, under Pol Pot. Food was still scarce, but he said there was no starvation when he was there. He was told that because the United Nations did not recognize the new government, "the Khmer would be on their own for a while" with only limited Russian assistance. But he thought morale was quite high since people in Kampuchea were extremely happy to have done with the Pol Pot regime.

This feeling appears general but may not be unanimous. One Khmer, a former stretcher-bearer for the Pol Pot forces, arrived in the Surin camp in Thailand on May 11 from a village in Oddar Meanchey. He told international observers that the Vietnamese troops were treating the local population "pretty well"; however, he said that the Vietnamese suspected some members of the UFNS forces of aiding Pol Pot, and he saw the Vietnamese disarming some of them. The disarming of Heng Samrin troops was also reported by a refugee from Battambang, interviewed by Chanthou Boua and James Pringle on May 21. From late February 1979, when according to refugees arriving in Aranyaprathet the Pol Pot forces regained possession of a number of villages and massacred large numbers of their inhabitants,<sup>13</sup> Vietnamese troops distributed arms to civilians for their self-protection. The recall of many of these weapons may signify a rationalization of the UFNS army, or, possibly, political difficulties within it.

While Kampuchean refugees continued to flee to Thailand from the fighting in their country (many of them marched along by armed Pol Pot soldiers under whose guard they remained while in Thailand),<sup>14</sup> some voluntarily went back the other way. These refugees, who fled Kampuchea before the change of government, headed for peaceful areas of the country where Pol Pot forces are no longer active. By early May 1979, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees, between 800 and 1,000 Khmers had returned home from the Surin camp. Later reports indicate that by the end of May another one thousand had gone back voluntarily to UFNS areas of Kampuchea from the Aranyaprathet camp.<sup>15</sup> Yet another thousand left for home in April from a camp 30 km. south of Pakse in Laos.

The general popularity of the new government in Kampuchea is to a large extent a reflection of the extreme unpopularity of its predecessor. But it has also had to overcome deep-rooted traditional ethnic prejudices between Kampuchians and Vietnamese. Reports about the good behavior of the Vietnamese troops towards civilians, carried by nearly all Kampuchians who came into contact with them and are now in Thailand, are not characteristic of reports about invading armies, nor of the way many Kampuchians used to talk about Vietnamese.



However, 10,000 ethnic Chinese residents of Kampuchea who crossed into Thailand in early May might have received different treatment. In a letter which they subsequently wrote to the Chinese embassy in Bangkok, these refugees made two points. Firstly, they claimed that in the years 1975-78 over half a million ethnic Chinese had died or were killed in Kampuchea. (One refugee also complained that the Chinese embassy had done "nothing" to protect the ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea during this period.) With the change of government in January, the letter went on to point out, the ethnic Chinese were at first allowed freedom to travel and earn their living at will.<sup>16</sup> But, in May "pressure against them" mounted and the Vietnamese "inspired disunity between the Kampuchians and the overseas Chinese," the letter said.

On being questioned about this, one of these refugees told journalists that "there was little direct abuse by the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea." But in the letter the ethnic Chinese said they had been blamed for Beijing's support of the Pol Pot government; this "caused simple-minded people to be more hateful to overseas Chinese. They beat and seized belongings of the overseas Chinese after the Vietnamese occupation," the letter said.<sup>17</sup>

Not long after, Vietnamese officers in Battambang province of Kampuchea reportedly announced that those ethnic Chinese who wanted to leave Kampuchea could do so. Thousands were taken in trucks to the Thai border. 30-year-old Ang Hua, one of a group of 4,500, told Associated Press "that his group never would go back to Kampuchea because they would be killed by Pol Pot troops. He said the Pol Pot side had branded all who joined the new government and the Vietnamese as 'traitors' and had executed many of them."<sup>18</sup>

According to press accounts, the Chinese were transported to Thailand by the Vietnamese in return for payment in gold.<sup>19</sup> During the May 21 interviews with Chanthou Boua and James Pringle, however, one ethnic Chinese at Aranyaprathet denied this, saying: "In the Chinese newspaper they said we had to pay money to leave Kampuchea, but that was not true. We were robbed when we crossed the border." Another of these refugees, asked about the difference between the regimes of Pol Pot and Heng Samrin, replied:

*There is not much difference but under the Vietnamese we have our own pots and pans . . . And also Heng Samrin's followers don't kill people.*

So why do you think that Heng Samrin is not better than Pol Pot ?

*Because they are very tough on the Chinese . . . but not on the Khmer.*

Tae Hui Lang, an ethnic Chinese refugee who left Kampuchea in late May 1979, was interviewed at length by Chanthou Boua and myself in Paris on August 10, 1979. Her account is worth giving in detail. Lang lived nearly four years under the Khmer

Rouge, an ordeal which ended with a month-long forced march through the forest of Pursat and Battambang provinces; during the battles that accompanied the march 'the rural population would gather together and then run behind the Vietnamese lines,' she said. Finally her Khmer Rouge escorts were driven off, and Lang and a group of other Khmer civilians were free to do the same. After being sent by the Vietnamese to a place where they could obtain food and water, they set out for the town of Battambang.

One woman in the group gave birth to a baby along the way. Some Vietnamese soldiers felt sorry for her, and arranged for a truck to take her the rest of the way. When she arrived in Battambang the Vietnamese brought milk and medicine to her and found a place for her to live. They carried her things for her and arranged for people to look after her, much to the woman's pleasure. Lang herself, who had a two-year old baby, was assisted in carrying her things by Vietnamese soldiers along the way. Although they couldn't speak any Khmer they still made a good impression on Lang's group. "I don't know what their politics was about, but from what I saw they did good things," Lang said. While marching through the forest, the Khmer Rouge had told her that the Vietnamese would kill civilians and molest women, but it didn't turn out to be true, she said.

There were both northern and southern Vietnamese troops. In their encounters with the Khmer population, the northerners behaved much better than the southerners, according to Lang. While walking to Battambang, Lang said she depended on the Vietnamese soldiers a lot, and always made sure that there were some on the road ahead to protect her. During this trip the northern troops warned her that the southerners might be a little undisciplined, and they were, although they never did any harm to Lang or anyone with her. "Their leaders were nice," Lang said.

Lang and her family arrived in Battambang city just before the Khmer New Year in April 1979. She found Vietnamese troops quartered in the city itself; Khmer civilians coming from the countryside were told to build houses for themselves outside the town center. There were many Khmers there, mostly former city dwellers or ethnic Chinese, or farmers who had been slightly better off than others in the pre-1975 period. There were many more women than men since "all the men had been killed off by the Khmer Rouge," Lang said.

There were 100 Vietnamese soldiers for every 10 Khmer troops of the new Heng Samrin government. Khmer officials were given the highest-ranking posts, such as province chief, but were flanked by Vietnamese officials from whom "they had to ask permission to get things done," according to Lang. She thinks this might have been because the Vietnamese "wanted to take over our land but at the same time give the false impression that the Khmer have power." Or alternatively it might have been because there were hardly any qualified Khmer officials, intellectuals or skilled personnel to be found. In fact, she said, there were "very few of them left, they had all been killed except for the ones who had managed to hide their backgrounds from the Khmer Rouge. Out of 100, only 2 or 3 were left."

Still, Lang says things were "like before" and that life was "normal," although the population were still scared of Khmer Rouge raids. The Khmer Rouge were by now reduced to small groups who sometimes made murderous sorties from the forest, but were no significant threat either to the population or to the Vietnamese army.

There was a Khmer New Year celebration in Battambang, organized as in pre-1975 years. The Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin troops didn't join in the dancing and festivities, but the latter appointed a committee (*kanak kammakar*) of people chosen from among the lower classes to organize the occasion. Songs were sung, and people visited newly-reopened pagodas. Although the Vietnamese army didn't provide much food for the population, Lang says the people were grateful to them for "letting us have freedom to do what we wanted . . . The people like the Vietnamese much more than the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese have more heart than the Khmer Rouge."

This also applied to the Vietnamese treatment of their prisoners Lang said. The Vietnamese had captured "many, many Khmer Rouge . . . they put them in trucks, sent them to jail, and even fed them full." The people were very angry and wanted to kill these Khmer Rouge but the Vietnamese tried to prevent them, advising them to let bygones be bygones and saying that they would try to re-educate the Khmer Rouge. But in a few cases, despite the efforts of the Vietnamese to stop them, the people could not hold back their anger and a number of Khmer Rouge prisoners were killed.

An important reason for her decision to leave was that, in her opinion, "the Khmer people now hate the Chinese minority" in Kampuchea. This was despite the fact that the local Chinese community had suffered under the Khmer Rouge as much as the ethnic Khmers had: "We weren't allowed even to speak Chinese; we were accused of being capitalists by the Khmer Rouge, we were killed off." During the Khmer Rouge period, her father at one stage asked some Chinese advisors, sent to Kampuchea by Beijing, for help in relieving the hardships of life, but they refused. But the population of Battambang in mid-1979 held China responsible for their own sufferings in the previous four years, and associated local Chinese with the Beijing government. Khmer civilians were in fact preparing to hold an anti-Chinese demonstration (*patekam*) in Battambang, "to smash the Chinese in Kampuchea," they said. The Vietnamese did not allow this, and warned people not to talk in terms of the Chinese, Khmer, and Vietnamese races. A Vietnamese leader addressed the crowd, saying that the ethnic Chinese had suffered under the Khmer Rouge, too, and asked people to calm down. He also asked those who wanted to fight the Chinese to put up their hands. A few hands were raised, and he told these people to pack up their things and get ready to go to fight against the Chinese aggressors who had attacked Vietnam. He pointed out that the Chinese residents of Kampuchea were not responsible for all that had happened: many of them had died, he said. After that the crowd calmed down and there was no demonstration, but anti-Chinese feeling among the Khmers subsisted. Many ethnic Chinese felt insecure, and didn't want to stay in Kampuchea any longer. Some of them went to see the Vietnamese leaders in Battambang, who recognized the situation and gave the Chinese a free choice of whether to go or stay. Lang was not required to make any payment to the Vietnamese in order to leave.

In five months of power the People's Republic of Kampuchea managed to make an impressive political start. Paris-based representatives of Khmer exiles recognize that "the present authorities in Phnom Penh" are not mere puppets of Vietnam but in fact "could become an important national political force after the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Kampuchea."<sup>20</sup> Whether the UFNS can maintain its evident popularity while it attempts to deal decisively with Pol Pot's army and Pol Pot's own foreign backers, and haul the country out of economic ruin under the threat of a very severe famine, remains to be seen.\*

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\*Or "*khmae daem*"; see *Khemara Niset*. no. 14, August 1952.

\*\*See, for example, Torben Retboll. "Kampuchea and the Reader's Digest" in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 11. No. 3 ( July-Sept. 1979 ) pp 22-27.

1. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22/12/78.

2. *For Eastern Economic Review*, 26/1/79.

3. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 29 March 1979.

4. 10 May 1979.

5. *Thai Nikorn*, Bangkok (Thai-language), 14 May 1979 , pp. 14-16.

6. AFP report by Joel Henri, Bangkok, 3 March 1979. Part of this report may be found in *Le Matin de Paris*, 5 March 1979.

7. *Business Times*, Bangkok, 2/5/79, carries an interview with a Khmer Serei officer who said the order to right alongside the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot "came through Bangkok on February 2," presumably from Paris. According to a Khmer-language weekly in Paris, "it is no longer a secret for anyone" that Khmer exile leader Son Sann met with Pol Pot representatives in Bangkok on 27-30 May 1979. (*Angkor*, 29/7/79.) The Thai government's role in fostering continued insecurity in Kampuchea was indicated by a UPI report from Bangkok by Paul Wedel on 14 May 1979. Wedel wrote: "Khmer Serei soldiers and Khmer Rouge deserters have set up a camp with over 5,000 people in the Cambodian mountains supported by the Thai military to oppose the Vietnamese occupation army, eyewitnesses have said . . . A 28-year-old refugee, who asked that his name not be revealed, said he was among almost 1,700 refugees from a camp in Thailand who were handed over to the guerrillas by Thai military officers." The refugees were involuntary recruits, and 1,000 of the Khmer Serei soldiers were "supplied from Thailand," Wedel went on. According to one aid organization, a short time later: "It is reliably reported that already 200 of the 1,700 (civilians) are dead, through lack of food and medical care." *Christian Outreach*, Newsletter no. 45, p.6.

8. *Nation Review*, Bangkok, 16/2/79.

9. *Ibid.*, 21/3/79.

10. AFP, 25 March 1979.

11. *Asiaweek*, 13/4/79.

12. Interview with *Bulletin de l'Association France-Cambodge*. July 1979.

13. See above. For further evidence, a missionary who speaks fluent Khmer and works closely with the Kampuchean refugees told me on 3 April 1979 that in several villages of Battambang province, returning Pol Pot troops had executed every single adult male in the village. He added, on the other hand, that "the Vietnamese seem OK, so far." According to US Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, Richard Holbrooke, Pol Pot forces in early 1979 "massacred a large number of villagers." He told a congressional hearing that "the Pol Pot forces killed the villagers because they had accepted pots and pans from the Vietnamese." This is confirmed by many other sources, See my articles in *Nation Review* (Melbourne), 5/4/79 and 24/5/79.

14. Thailand has not prevented Pol Pot troops from killing, on Thai soil, a large number of Kampuchean refugees and a number of Thai citizens as well. See *Nation Review* (Melbourne) 24/5/79, and AP dispatch from Khaw Sa-Thon, Thailand, by Visetsak Sanguangpong; W 105, R33, May 1979. The latter quotes a refugee, Tee Suphat, 25, "who admitted he had acted as a guard for the Pol Pot side," as saying that Pol Pot soldiers trekking "with the civilian columns along the border were given "permission" from higher echelons to execute suspected traitors . . . He claimed to have seen the bodies of about 40 Cambodian civilians including children, stabbed to death by Pol Pot soldiers just inside Cambodia across from the Thai province of Chanthaburi. The Pol Pot soldiers he talked to said the dead were "traitors."

15. These people are quite distinct from those, said to be over 40,000, forcibly sent back to Kampuchea against their will, either into the hands of Pol Pot forces, or Khmer Serei forces, or into jungled sections of the frontier sown with minefields. For a horrifying report of these people's fate and the callous role of the Thai Special Forces, see *Liberation*, Paris 9 July 1979, based on an eyewitness account.

16. *Bangkok Post*, 11/5/79.

17. *Business Times*, Bangkok, 16/5/79.

18. *Bangkok Post*, 23/5/79.

19. See for instance, *Business Times*, 17/5/79.

20. *Angkor* (Paris), 29/7/79.